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Abstract

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, carried out via aircraft hijackings,
clearly demonstrated the massive destruction potential when vulnerabilities in the
aviation system are exploited. Airport security measures have since been strengthened
and new measures have been set in place. With the passage of the Aviation
Transportation and Security Act (ATSA) of 2001 the checked baggage systems at U.S.
Airports are now required to screen all checked bags with explosive detection devices.
This is a significant increase from the small percentage of bags that were previously
screened. The original 2009 deadline was changed to 31 December 2002 and this change
forced airports to implement interim screening systems. These systems can impact the
efficient processing of passengers and baggage. A long term solution is needed for a 100
percent checked baggage system that provides the required security while minimizing
negative impacts to aviation stakeholders including the airport operators, airlines,
passengers, and the Transportation Security Administration. This thesis, focusing on the
Dayton International Airport, uses a Value Focused Thinking methodology to build a
value model for evaluating potential long term solutions for 100 percent checked baggage
system alternatives.

xii

LONG TERM IMPLEMENTATION OF
A 100 PERCENT BAGGAGE SREENING SYSTEM:
A VALUE FOCUSED THINKING APPROACH
Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Background
The aviation system of the United States consists of more than 400 hundred
airports and thousands of aircraft serving over 2 million passengers each day (GAO/T
RCED-00-125:3). Both the U.S. and global economies are dependent upon a reliable and
safe means of air transportation. Security for the aviation system in the United States has
historically been the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which
was created in 1958 and became part of the Department of Transportation in 1967.
The very features of the aviation system that allow it to function so effectively
make it susceptible to terrorist attacks. Most airports were designed prior to major
concerns about security. Airports were designed with large open and generally accessible
areas. Each airport is unique in its layout, number of airline carriers, and other
stakeholders. Airports, and their associated support facilities, are scattered throughout
the nation. The dispersed nature of our aviation system makes it difficult to secure all
possible vulnerabilities. Airports were designed for efficient and cost effective travel.
Security measures often add time to travel and make the travel system less efficient. In
addition, public airports are owned and operated by diverse state and local governments.
Airports are integrated parts of the economy in many cities, with communities relying on
them to bring in business travelers and tourists.
1

Airports continue to be vulnerable targets. The introduction of new and improved
security measures has unfortunately been mainly reactive to the type of terrorist event
that occurred and mitigated the exploited vulnerability. One such security measure is the
screening of passengers, as well as their carry on and checked bags, for weapons and
explosives (NMAB 482-3:1998: v).
On 21 December 1988, Pan American Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie
Scotland as a result of an explosive device hidden inside a suitcase. In response to this
terrorist act, the U.S. enacted the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. Through
this act the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began funding the development of
Explosive Detection System (EDS) technology to be used to screen checked baggage.
The FAA continued to expand its EDS technology purchases and certifications (NMAB
482-3:1998: v). In 1994, the FAA approved the first EDS system, Invision CTX 5000,
for use at U.S. Airports. The international aviation community also responded to the Pan
American Flight tragedy with the use of EDS technology. The United Kingdom began to
install EDS machines for airport checked baggage systems in 1990. By 1998, all
commercial airports in the U.K. had 100 percent screening of checked baggage. The
target date goal within the U.S. for 100 percent screening originally established by the
FAA was 2009. However, recent events changed that time horizon.
On 11 Sept 2001, terrorists demonstrated how our transportation system could be
used as a means to carry out new acts of destruction, literally making weapons out of
passenger aircraft. These acts highlighted weaknesses within the aviation transportation
system. These weaknesses include the limited capabilities of airport security to screen all
potential terrorists and their weapons from boarding aircraft. These acts also increased
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public awareness to the fact that not all checked baggage was being screened for
explosives.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established with the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of Nov 19, 2001(Public Law 107-71). This law
assigned the responsibility of aviation security to the TSA. This act also included several
security mandates with implementation deadlines. One of the mandates was the
requirement to have 100 percent of checked bags screened with EDS technology by the
end of 31 December 2002. The short timeframe (19 November 2001 to 31 December
2002) given to the newly formed TSA and airports to meet the mandate of 100 percent
baggage screening forced the implementation of interim systems, without the time and
resources necessary to fully accommodate all potential concerns of the stakeholders
impacted by the system. These concerns would have normally been captured during the
lengthier design process that was anticipated by the FAA’s earlier stated 2009 deadline.
To satisfy the 31 December 2002 mandate, some airports installed large, heavy EDS
machines in the airport lobbies, impacting lobby floor space due to the sizable EDS
machines and additional queuing lines necessary for passengers to hand carry their
checked bags to these screening machines. With the mandate met and the immediate
threat mitigated, there is now time to consider additional relevant issues and objectives
involved with selecting a long term solution for a 100 percent checked baggage system.

1.2 Problem Statement
The objective of this study is to assist the stakeholders of the aviation system with
the long term implementation of the 100 percent checked baggage screening. While
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every effort was made to consider all relevant factors while meeting this mandate, not all
concerns were articulated and considered in the reduced implementation timeline. Using
a decision analysis methodology known as Value Focused Thinking (VFT), the values
important to a long term solution of a checked baggage system can be captured in a value
hierarchy model. VFT is a process for capturing values that can be used to create
alternatives to decision problems as well as evaluate how well different alternatives meet
the expressed values. (Keeney, 1997:3)
Airport security involves many stakeholders including the passengers, airlines,
airports, the FAA, the TSA, and public communities. The level of security to be
provided must be balanced against the effect that a security level will have on the
efficiency of operations, that which will be tolerated by the passengers, and that which
the government, (local, state, regional, and federal), airports, and airlines can afford to
implement. The VFT methodology assists in the evaluation and balancing of these values
for various competing objectives as well as capturing their importance to the decisionmaker into a value hierarchy model.

1.3 Problem Approach
Airport security depends on an evolving science with new technologies and
systems constantly being introduced and tested. Dayton International Airport, as well as
all other commercial airports across the country, has implemented a 100 percent baggage
checking system. The checked baggage system in place at Dayton International Airport
is an interim solution. EDS and explosive trace detection machines (ETD) were placed in
the airport lobby in front of airline check in counters. Passengers hand carry their bags to
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the screening machines after checking in with the airlines. Once the bags are cleared in
the passenger’s presence, the bags are left with the TSA personnel and then transferred to
the airlines. Meanwhile, the passengers move to the passenger screening area and
departure gates.
The long term solution for the checked baggage system includes multiple
objectives such as the prevention of incidents that could harm passengers, maintaining an
efficient flow of passengers, and the public acceptance of security measures. Focusing
on what objectives are valuable for a long term solution will lead to the creation of a
value hierarchy that captures the value of checked baggage systems. This value driven
approach can also lead to the development of alternatives that were not previously
foreseen.

1.4 Research Scope
The decision perspective for this thesis is from that of the Dayton International
Airport’s Director of Aviation as well as the airport’s stakeholders (Airlines, TSA, and
Passengers). The focus of this research provides support to the personnel responsible for
managing and implementing a 100 percent checked baggage system as well as those
stakeholders affected by the system. Tangible benefits from this study are applicable to
other airports, as they face the same challenges. This study does not address specific
airport security vulnerabilities or measures that would require this document to be
classified.

5

1.5 Overview and Format
This thesis is organized into five chapters. A literature review of airport security
law, regulations for checked baggage, as well as an introduction into VFT is provided in
Chapter 2. A presentation of the value of checked baggage system, how this value is
measured using VFT, and how it can be applied to decision makers in the area of airport
security is provided in Chapter 3. A demonstration of this value model using two
notional alternatives is provided in Chapter 4. Conclusions from this study, as well as
recommendations for further research, are provided in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
This chapter provides a review of the pertinent literature in the field of airport
security and decision analysis. This includes the laws and regulations that assign
responsibility and direct the implementation of airport security to various stakeholders.
The decision analysis method of Value Focused Thinking (VFT) is also reviewed. A
description of how this method can benefit airport security is also provided.

2.1 Transportation Security
The medium of transportation involves moving people, goods, and services
around the nation and the globe via highway, rail, waterways, and air. Terrorists
exploited the vulnerabilities of the aviation system on 11 September 2001, turning jet
airliners into guided missiles. The Transportation Research Board suggests the following
characteristics of transportations systems make them vulnerable targets for future terrorist
attacks (TRB Special Report 270, 2002:1-3).
1. Openness and Accessibility – Most of the transportation system was
built prior to concern with terrorism and must be accessible to the
public
2. Extent and Ubiquity – There are over 400 commercial airports and
14,000 general aviation airports dispersed across the country
3. Efficiency and Competitiveness – The various modes of transportation
require maximum efficiency to allow for competition between them.
4. Owner, Overseer, and Operator Diversity – The public sector owns
and operates much of the transportation infrastructure such as airports
and railroads.
5. Entwinement in Society and Global Economy – highways, railways,
airways, and waterways connect small towns and major cities across
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the nation and support the economy through tourism, mail delivery,
daily commuting travel, and the delivery of products and services
These very features, which support the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation’s
transportation system, leave it vulnerable to exploitation.

2.2 FAA and TSA RESPONSIBILITIES
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was created in 1958 to be
responsible for a safe aviation system. The FAA is a principal government organization
responsible for regulating the design and operating standards of airports. One of the
FAA’s objectives is to reduce vulnerabilities of the air travel system to terrorist threats.
This was accomplished with procedures and supporting technologies to detect, deter, and
react to these threats before they can cause harm. In response to the bombing of Pan
American Flight 103 the FAA issued a directive to purchase technology capable of
detecting explosives in checked bags. The most advanced technology available at that
time was Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) machines. After testing, the FAA discovered
that the TNA machines were not capable of detecting explosives at low enough levels
necessary to detect all critical quantities of explosives, such as the amount of explosive
believed to have been used on Pan Am Flight 103. The FAA continued making efforts
towards other detection systems. The FAA began testing of EDS machines in 1990 and
developed classified certification criteria in 1993. These criteria include standards for
various types of explosives, baggage throughput rates, and acceptable rates for false
alarm and detection (GAO/RCED 97-119, 1997:3). The first approved EDS system
received FAA certification in 1994; it was the INVISON CTX-5000. The FAA then
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began deploying EDS machines at select airports over the course of the next several
years.
The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 2000 required the FAA to gradually
increase the number of checked bags being screened by EDS machines to reach 100
percent screening of checked baggage by 2009. The terrorist acts of 11 September 2001
led to passing of the Air Transportation and Security Act (ATSA) of 2001. This act
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and gave this organization the
responsibility for security in all modes of transportation.
The TSA took over primary responsibility for aviation security on 17 February
2002. The ATSA of 2001 mandated that 100 percent of checked baggage be screened
with EDS machines by 31 December 2002. This new date required the deployment of
these large, heavy EDS machines to 429 commercial airports with little time to consider
how they would effect processing of passengers and their bags. Many airports were not
designed with the necessary floor space required to accommodate these machines or with
the space needed to adequately integrate them into baggage handling systems. The TSA,
along with the various airports and airlines were forced to implement the best alternative
attainable within the short timeframe.

2.3 Implementing 100 Percent Checked Baggage Screening
A white paper prepared by RAND examined the FAA plans for implementation of
the EDS machines to meet the 31 December 02. This study identified several problems
with the implementing the deployment schedule. One of these problems reinforces the
need for an airport level study.
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The FAA’s “top-down” approach does not adequately consider local
constraints, such as the size of the airport terminal. It is space constraints,
not machine availability that is the proverbial long pole in the tent. Until
suitable airport facilities are constructed, many of the EDS machines now
being acquired at a highly accelerated rate cannot be installed (Kauvar,
Rostker, and Shaver, 2002:4)
Whether new facilities are built or existing facilities are modified, the objectives of the
stakeholders affected by 100 percent checked baggage screening should be identified.
These objectives can then be incorporated into the decision making process for selection
of the system most suited for a particular airport.
Dayton International Airport, as with airports around the country, has interim
measures in place to satisfy the 100 percent screening requirement. The long term
solutions to satisfy the requirement while meeting the objectives of the airports, airlines,
and TSA have yet to be resolved. A report prepared by the FAA provided the following
planning considerations for future checked baggage screening (Lazarick and Cammaroto,
2001:92). 1
1. Adequate space allocation for equipment
2. Queuing space
3. Adequate power sources
4. Communications and environmental equipment
5. Adequate floor loading
6. Appropriate facilities where passengers and their baggage can be reunited
for the purpose of alarm resolution
Other considerations include a system that will provide convenience to the passenger,
maximize the throughput of bags, minimize the impact on airline personnel, and
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maximize the effectiveness of security. The Dayton International Airport must
implement a long term solution that will best satisfy the objectives for security while not
losing focus on the fact that the airport is a business and the passengers are the customers
who have objectives to be included as well. It is the stakeholders at the airport level that
will best provide the objectives and considerations most important in a 100 percent
checked baggage system.

2.4 Decision Analysis
Determining which checked baggage system alternative is best suited to meet the
objectives of the Dayton International Airport stakeholders is a complex problem. There
are several different alternatives available to the airport. Each alternative has its pros and
cons, and each satisfies the various objectives differently. These objectives include: How
does the system impact passenger convenience? Will the system require more manpower
from the airport and airlines than the current system? Will the system require more
terminal floor space or construction of new facilities? There are a number of checked
baggage system alternatives and numerous objectives that each alternative should be
evaluated against. A multi-objective decision analysis technique can provide the
methodology necessary to clearly layout this problem. Decision analysis can be used to
handle problems with several variables and objectives that would otherwise be too
complicated and confusing.
2.4.1 Introduction to Decision Analysis
Decision Analysis (DA) is a “prescriptive approach designed for normally
intelligent people who want to think hard and systematically about some important real
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problems” (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: vii). Decision Analysis allows problems to be
evaluated with an assortment of structures such as decision trees, influence diagrams, and
value hierarchies (Clemen, 1996:2). Through decision analysis the decision maker is
able to better structure complex decisions, gain additional insight to the problem, and
consider the trade offs between multiple objectives.
2.4.2 Alternative versus Value Focused Thinking
The standard approach to decision making is alternative focused thinking. This is
the process of reviewing the existing alternatives in search of the best one. Decision
makers limit themselves through Alternative Focused Thinking. It is possible that not
one currently available alternative is best suited for the decision maker. Value Focused
Thinking (VFT) is an approach that relies on the values important to the decision maker
(Keeney, 1992:6). These values are used to structure a value model that can be used to
generate the best alternative. The VFT approach requires the decision maker to answer
the questions about what is of value with regard to the decision to be made.

2.5 Value Focused Thinking
Decision analysis and VFT have been used to successfully assist decision makers
in several different private, public, and government organizations. Keefer, Corner, and
Kirkwood (2000) performed a literature review of the major operations research journals
from 1990 to 1999. Their review included articles and texts that used decision analysis
methods as well. The review included 57 application articles grouped into Energy,
Services and Manufacturing, Medical, Military, Public Policy, and General categories.
Their literature review highlights the fact that decision analysis and VFT have been
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applied in a wide variety of fields. Two such examples are outlined in the next few
paragraphs.
VFT was used to “examine the concepts, capabilities, and technologies the United
States will require to remain the dominant air and space force in the future (Jackson,
Jones, and Lehmkul, 1996:iii). In 1995, General Ronald R. Fogleman, the Air Force
Chief of Staff, tasked Air University to “generate ideas and concepts on the capabilities
the United States will require to possess the dominant air and space forces in the future”.
This study, entitled Air Force 2025, and an accompanying value model was developed
using the VFT methodology to select the best systems and technologies for the Air Force
given alternative futures (Jackson, Jones, and Lehmkul, 1996). The value model created
was very robust; it included 134 force qualities, each with a measure of merit and value
function. A value model with this detail can be used to evaluate a diverse set of systems.
This model was also used to forecast decisions further in the future than any known
military value model (Jackson, Jones, and Lehmkul, 1996:14).
VFT was also used in a study to assist action officers at the Air Force Force
Protection Battlelab in their evaluation method used for potential force protection
initiatives. The VFT process enabled the action officers to create a value model
quantifying the objectives important to the Air Force. Previously, the Battlelab relied on
the skills of the action officers to present and defend their interpretation of proposed
initiatives rather than comparing each initiative based on an equivalent set of merits and
the relative benefit of each proposed initiative (Jurk, 2002).
Clearly, VFT has been used to assist in a number of complex decision
environments.
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2.5.1 Benefits of VFT
The following figure from Keeney’s text provides an overview of how VFT can
benefit the decision making process.

Creating
Alternatives

Identifying
decision
opportunities

Uncovering
hidden
objectives

Guiding
strategic
thinking

Thinking
About
Values

Evaluating
alternatives

Improving
communication

Interconnecting
decisions

Guiding
information
collection

Facilitating
involvement
in multiple
stakeholder
decisions

Keeney, 1992: 24

Figure 1: Benefits of Value Focused Thinking
“The language of value-focused thinking is the common language about the
achievement of objectives in any particular decision context” (Keeney 1997:25). As a
result, the participants in this type of problem solving are not limited to those with
technical expertise and the identification of objectives can be made with a greater amount
of understanding. By using the language of values rather than alternatives, stakeholders
can focus on the conflicts that may arise within these values rather than conflicts in which
alternative they personally believe to be the best.
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2.6 10 Step Process for VFT
The VFT methodology allows decision makers to obtain a value model which
includes everything important to the decision maker. The process can be divided into 10
steps which are provided in the Figure 2 (Shoviak, 2001: 63). Shoviak developed this
framework in part based on the work of Keeney (1992), Kirkwood (1997), and Kloeber
(2000) who examine the use of Value Focused Thinking in decisions with multiple
objectives. These steps are not sequential but and are meant to be performed in an
interactive manner. These 10 steps for VFT will be used as the methodology framework
for conducting this study.
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St ep 1:
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Creat e Value
Hierarchy

St ep 3:
Develop Evaluat ion
Measures

St ep 4:
Creat e Value
Funct ions

St ep 5:
W eight Value
Hierarchy

St ep 6:
Alt ernat ive
Generat ion

St ep 7:
Alt ernat ive Scoring

Value
Model

St ep 9:
Sensit ivit y Analysis

St ep 8:
Det erm inist ic
Analysis

St ep 10:
Conclusions &
Recom m endat ions

(Shoviak, 2001:63)

Figure 2: VFT: 10 Step Process
2.6.1 Step 1: Problem Identification
During this first step the decision maker should ask “What is the fundamental
issue?” Identifying the overall objective of the problem clearly during this step will
ensure the rest of the steps can be used effectively in order to solve the problem in the
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best manner. As an example, consider a fundamental objective of choosing the best
sports car. This example will be used to assist in illustrating the VFT methodology.
A poorly defined problem will most likely lead to an unwanted or useless value model.
2.6.2 Step 2: Create Value Hierarchy
A value hierarchy begins with a fundamental objective as defined in Step 1. The
fundamental objective is then decomposed into sub-objectives which provide more detail.
Each sub-objective is expanded until it can be defined by a single attribute.
There are five desirable properties of a value hierarchy; small size, operability,
completeness, non-redundancy, and decomposability. (Kirkwood, 1997:16). The small
size is important because that helps in the ease of understanding. A very large hierarchy
with hundreds of objectives can be too difficult to understand. The small size property
leads into the operable property. This methodology is used to assist decision makers and
therefore it should be able to do just that. A model that is not easy to use or understand is
often not operable. The completeness property describes the need for the hierarchy to
provide enough detail so that key features of the fundamental objective are discernable
and the differences in these features are captured by the hierarchy. The completeness
property is often referred to as collectively exhaustive. The non-redundancy property
describes the need to have a hierarchy that does not include more than one objective that
describes the same feature. This is also referred to as mutual exclusivity.
Continuing with the “Buy the Best Sports Car” example, Figure 3 illustrates a
hierarchy starting with the fundamental objective of buying the best sports car. The
fundamental objective is decomposed into three sub-objectives which are functionality,
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performance, and safety. These sub-objectives are decomposed one more time until the
sub-objectives are reached that can be measured.

Buy the Best
Sports Car

Funtionality

Room

Performance

Acceleration

Safety

Power

Crash Test
Rating

Figure 3: Buy Best Sports Car Value Hierarchy
2.6.3 Step 3: Develop Evaluation Measures
For this step measures are assigned to each of the lowest level sub-objectives.
Measures have scales which are either natural or constructed and direct or proxy. A
Natural scale is one that is already accepted by most people. An example is miles per
gallon which is commonly used for vehicle fuel efficiency. A constructed scale is created
for a specific decision to quantify how well a sub-objective is met. “A direct scale
measures the degree of attainment of an objective, while a proxy scale reflects the degree
of attainment of its associated objective, but does not directly measure this”(Kirkwood,
1997:24). A direct scale can provide a direct measurement for how well a sub-objective
is satisfied. The miles per gallon measure is also an example of a measure with a direct
scale. A proxy scale provides a representation for how well a sub-objective is satisfied.
An example of a direct scale is human age in years. An example of a proxy scale is the
gross national product (GNP) which is often used to describe the development of a
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country (Kirkwood, 1997:24). Continuing with the “Buy the Best Sports Car”example,
measures for each of the lowest tier sub-objectives are shown on the bottom level of the
hierarchy in Figure 4. In this example there are two measures for the Room subobjective. These measures are the number of seats and the leg room. The upper and
lower bounds for the scales are then developed for each measure that captures the range
of feasible data. For the Number of Seats measure, the upper and lower bounds are 5 and
2 respectively, for example.

Buy the Best
Sports Car

Funtionality

Room

# of
Seats

Leg
Room

Performance

Safety

Acceleration

Power

Crash Test
Rating

0 t o 60
m ph
t im e

Horse
power

Crash
Rating

Figure 4: Buy Best Sports Car Value Hierarchy with measures
2.6.4 Step 4: Create Value Functions
Value Functions are used to assign a value from 0 to 1 to data for each measure
for each alternative. These value functions are single dimensional and are either
monotonically increasing or decreasing functions. Two common types of value functions
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are the exponential and piecewise linear. An example of an exponential and piecewise
value functions are provided in Figure 5. Both of these functions are monotonically
increasing. The functions increase in value on the Y-axis as the score increases on the xaxis. The piecewise linear function has two different slopes that convert the x-axis score
to a y-axis value. An exponential value function that is monotonically decreasing is

Value

Value

provided in Figure 6.

Score

Score

Value

Figure 5: Exponential and Piecewise Linear Value Functions

Score

Figure 6: Exponential Value Function
2.6.5 Step 5: Weight Hierarchy
The decision maker is unlikely to value each objective of the value hierarchy
equally. Therefore, the decision maker will need to assign a weight to each objective to
represent the importance of each. The “100 marble method” was used for this study. The
decision maker has 100 imaginary marbles to assign to each objective within each branch
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of each tier of the hierarchy. The number of marbles assigned represents the relative
preference of the objectives. The 100 marbles are notional, and are used to assist the
decision maker in assigning direct weights to the hierarchy.
The example hierarchy for the Buy Best Sports Car example has been given
weights as shown in Figure 7. Using the 100 marble method the decision maker for this
problem gave both functionality and safety 20 marbles each and performance 60 marbles.
The marbles are then divided by 100 so that the total of the weight sums to 1. The same
method is applied for the next tier. Functionality and Safety have one sub-objective each
so they receive 100 marbles and the corresponding weight is 1.0. The performance
objective has two sub-objectives, acceleration and power. The acceleration and power
sub-objectives were given 60 and 40 marbles respectively. Their corresponding weights
are therefore .60 and .40.
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Performance
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Figure 7: Buy Best Sports Car Hierarchy with Weights
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2.6.6 Step 6: Generate Alternatives
Alternatives that appear to satisfy the objectives of the value hierarchy developed
in Step 2 can be used along with existing alternatives to be evaluated and compared in
later steps.
2.6.7 Step 7: Score Alternatives
Data for each of the measures developed in Step 3 are now needed for each of the
alternatives generated in the previous Step. Each alternative is scored based on the
SDVF for each measure. The score for each measure of the hierarchy should be
determined for all of the alternatives before moving to the next measure. Scoring is done
from specific data for natural direct measures to subject matter experts’ opinion for less
quantitative measures.
2.6.8 Step 8: Deterministic Analysis
In this study a decision analysis software package, Logical Decisions for
Windows, was used to input the information and data from the previous steps. Once the
data for each measure was input on all of the alternatives an overall value for can be
computed for each alternative.
The overall value for the alternatives is computed using the additive value
function. This function uses the SDVF and weights assigned to each measure to create an
overall score for a given alternative.
n

v( x) = ∑ λiν i ( xi )
i =1
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V(x) is the total value for an alternative, λi is the weight for each measure from i to n,
and vi(xi) is the score each measure attains from its value function (Kirkwood, 1997, 230).
2.6.9 Step 9: Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity Analysis is performed to examine how a change in the assigned
weights will affect the overall value scores for the alternatives. This is done by varying
the weights of an objective from 0 to 1 while maintaining the original proportion of the
weight with the other objectives. This can be done at any tier of the hierarchy. This step
provides valuable insight to the decision maker. It highlights the objectives that with a
realistic change in weighting, effect which alternative receives the highest score. It can
also show the insignificance of the weight given to an objective, provided that with any
reasonable change of it’s weighting, makes no difference to the alternative rankings.
Such analysis helps to focus weighting efforts on those objectives where a reasonable
change may alter the decision.
2.6.10 Step 10: Recommendation and Conclusions
Insight gained from the VFT process is now provided to the decision maker to
include how each alternative ranks and how the alternative scores can be improved with
the identification of value gaps. Once the decision maker has been presented with the
results the value hierarchy can be used again in an iterative method of generating and
evaluating future alternatives for the same problem.
Chapter 2 has provided the basic background required to execute this study.
Chapter 3 will detail the application of VFT approach to the Dayton International
Airports 100 percent checked baggage decision environment.
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Chapter 3. Value Model Development
Chapter 3 develops the value model built for the Dayton International Airport.
The chapter follows the ten step process discussed in Chapter 2 and presents the elements
of the model.

3.1 Step 1: Problem Identification
The fundamental objective of this study is to capture the values important in a 100
percent checked baggage system at the Dayton International Airport. The system
includes the screening machines, conveyor system, and personnel responsible for
screening and handling the checked bags. Specifically, the system of study starts from the
point where a checked bag is given a flight identification tag at the airline check-in
counters and ends at the point the bag arrives at the airline make up room. The make up
rooms are where the bags are delivered to the airline baggage handlers. The custody of
the bags is transferred from TSA to the airlines at this point. Once delivered to the
respective make up rooms the screening of the bags has been completed and the airline
personnel can organize and prepare to load them on their planes.
The decision maker for this problem is the Director of Aviation at Dayton
International Airport. The Director of Aviation is concerned with operating a safe airport
that provides an efficient flow of passengers. Several stakeholders are involved in the
operation of an airport and are impacted by a checked baggage screening system. To
gain insight and concerns from these stakeholders an integrated study team was formed
consisting of members of the Director of Aviation’s staff, the TSA Head of baggage
screening managers and two airline managers from major airlines servicing Dayton
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International Airport. The study team was used throughout the model development to
elicit values and construct measures.

3.2 Step 2: Construct Value Hierarchy
For this step, the study team provided the objectives they believed to be important
to the fundamental objective. This process consisted of a series of six group sessions.
The study group started the hierarchy development by creating an affinity diagram for the
checked baggage system. Each stakeholder provided what they believed to be the most
important considerations for the system. These items were listed individually until all
concerns were captured and recorded. The items were then combined into common
groups. A total of fifty items of value were grouped under five main headings which are
Passenger Impact, Efficient, Security, Reliability (which evolved to “Ease of Operation”),
and Flexibility. The results from the affinity diagram are provided in Table 1.
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Table 1: Checked Baggage System Affinity Diagram
Passenger
Impact

Efficient

Security

Clarity of Use

Bottlenecks,
logistics

Security of
equipment

# times
handling bags

Flow efficiency
/ congestion at
end of system
Impact on
airline staff
# times
handling bags
Efficient,
throughput

Vulnerability

Visibility of
bags
Customer
Hassle
-Queues

-lines
Passenger
confidence
Passenger
convenience
Visibility of
security
Integrated with
checkpoint

Visibility of
equipment
Alarm
resolution
Isolation
capability of
major hit /
security breech

Automated kick
off for flagged
bag
Uninterrupted
flow
Space
utilization
Different run
speeds
Reaction to first
hit
Flow assurity bags to right
place

Reliability
(Ease of
Operation)
Reliability,
maintainability,
availability
Safety

Flexibility

Exposure to
radiation
Comfort of
screeners
Environment of
screeners

re-routing

Impact on
airline staff
Work within
environment

Back-up
technology

Shut down
procedures
Upgradeable
Expandable
Scalability
- operationally

These common headings became the initial first tier of the hierarchy. Over the course of
the next several meetings these 1st tier objectives were refined into sub-objectives.
During the affinity diagram process the group also identified cost related items.
The cost items were treated separately and used to form a cost hierarchy. The intent was
to create a cost to benefit comparison between the overall cost given by the cost hierarchy
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and the benefit captured by the checked baggage system hierarchy. The benefits and
costs of each approach would then be analyzed. The cost hierarchy is discussed after the
100 percent checked baggage hierarchy. The complete hierarchy for the 100 percent
checked baggage system is provided in Figure 8 to illustrate the size and extent of the
model.
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Figure 8: Checked Baggage System Hierarchy

The five first tier objectives of the checked baggage system hierarchy, starting from the
left and moving right are Passenger Impact, Efficient, Security, Ease of Operation, and
Flexibility. Each first tier objective and corresponding sub-objectives is referred to as a
branch. The objectives within this model are discussed in detail beginning with the
fundamental objective and then by branch, starting with the Passenger Impact branch and
moving to the right of the hierarchy. The discussion of each branch includes the
development of evaluation measures and value functions. The evaluation measures are
used for the lowest tier objectives to determine how an alternative meets the objectives.
The value functions convert actual data for each measure (x-axis) to a value (y-axis). The
y-axis value ranges from 0 to 1. A value of 0 represents the least desirable data for a
measure while a value of 1.0 represents the most desirable data.
3.2.1 Decompose Fundamental Objective
The main objective of this checked baggage system hierarchy to provide the best
long term solution to a 100 percent checked baggage system for the Dayton International
Airport. The system will include detection equipment such as Explosive Trace Detection
(ETD) systems, EDS machines, conveyor systems, and operators necessary to run the
system. The approved explosive screening equipment used for any alternative must be
certified by the FAA as meeting minimum performance standards. Additionally, the TSA
must approve the equipment to be used at Dayton International Airport. There are a
limited number of manufacturers of explosive detection machines that have been
approved for use in airports. The TSA, who currently selects and pays for the EDS
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equipment, has final approval. The hierarchy includes objectives that can be used to
differentiate and recommend using a specific manufacturer’s equipment.
3.2.2 Passenger Impact Branch
The Passenger Impact branch includes items derived from the affinity diagram
process that represent the ‘hassle factor’ for passengers. The hassle factor is the amount
of inconvenience the passenger perceives as a result of the checked baggage system.
While the study group did not include a passenger representative, all members relied on
their own experiences as passengers, as well as the airport operators and airlines expertise
in dealing with passengers, to develop objectives for this branch.
The convenience objectives were broken down into the handling of bags and the
time needed of the passenger to complete bag screening. The passenger impact branch
included an objective for the confidence the passengers have that the system is providing
effective security, both in the inspection of the baggage for explosives and in the
protection of their property. The study group believes that this perception is positive
when passengers can see that a screening process is taking place. Figure 9 illustrates the
sub-objectives that were developed for the Passenger Impact branch of the checked
baggage system hierarchy.
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Figure 9: Passenger Impact Branch
An important part of the hierarchy development is clearly defining the meaning of
the objectives. The definitions used for the Passenger Impact Branch objectives and subobjectives are provided in Table 2. The next step for this branch was to define measures
for each of the lowest tier objectives that can be used to determine how well each
objective is attained by a 100 percent checked baggage system.
Table 2: Passenger Impact Sub-objective Definitions
Passenger Impact
Confidence
Communicate Security
Convenience
Handling Bags
Time

Confidence the passenger has that the baggage screening
system is providing security and the convenience
provided while doing so.
Trust the passengers has that the screening system is
protecting him/her from danger
Providing information about the security screening
system through any means such as CCTV, windows, or
other display devices
Minimizing the work and time required from the
passenger
The effort required from the passenger to clear his/her
checked bags
The time required from the passenger to clear his/her
checked bags
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Measures were developed for each of the lowest tier sub-objectives. These measures
have been added to the Passenger Impact branch and are displayed below the lowest tier
sub-objectives for this branch in Figure 10.
100 Percent
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M inute s
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V isible
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Figure 10: Passenger Impact Branch with Measures
A summary of the measure definitions for the Passenger Impact branch are provided in
Table 3. The next step for this Branch is to define value functions.

Table 3: Definitions of Passenger Impact Measures
Measure
Visible System

Definition
A system that can be seen by the
passengers
The distance that the passenger has to
move checked bag in screening process
The number of times the passenger has to
move checked bag from one screening
station to another before screeners take
custody of the bag.
The time the passenger is required to wait
while the checked bag is being screened.

Distance (feet)
Times Handled

Time in Line (minutes)
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3.2.3 Passenger Impact Branch SDVFs
The Passenger Impact branch consists of four measures; single dimension value
functions (SDVF) were developed for each by the study group. A brief discussion of
each value function is provided separately.
3.2.3.1 Visible System
A system that can be seen by the passenger allows the passengers to see that the
bags are being screened for potential threats. As stated earlier, it is preferred to have a
checked baggage system that is visible. This visibility can be provided by means such as
a closed circuit television, window to screening operation area, or a display system
illustrating the routing of the bags to screening machines. The study group believes that
passengers will have confidence in a visible system. This SDVF is categorical in that the
system either is visible or not. A visible system receives a value of 1.0. A system that is
not visible receives a value of 0.0. The Visible System SDVF is provided in Figure 11.
1.0
0.9
0.8

Value

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Yes

No

Can the system be seen by m eans such as CCTV, display
system , w indow s, etc?

Figure 11: Visible System SDVF
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3.2.3.2 Distance SDVF
It is preferred to have a system that will not require the passengers to move their
bags at all after checking them in at the airline ticket counter. A system that requires
passengers to move their bags 100 feet or more receives a value of 0.0. The Distance
SDVF in Figure 12 gives a value of 1.0 for a system that does not require passengers to
move their bags after tagging at the check out counter. A distance between 0 and 100
feet linearly decreases in value.
Distance Measure
1

Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

20

40

60

80

100

Feet

Figure 12: Distance SDVF
3.2.3.3 Number of Times SDVF
The Number of Times SDVF is used to assign a value based on how many
different locations the passengers have to take their bags after tagging until they turn over
the custody of the bags to the screeners or airlines. Having to move bags a number of
different times between security stations is considered an inconvenience as was the
distance required to move the bags. Not handling the bags at all after tagging receives a
value of 1.0. Handling them once receives a value of 0.5 and handling them more than
once receives a value of 0.0. The Number of Times SDVF is provided in Figure 13.
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Value

Times Handled
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
None

One

Tw o or More

Tim es Handled

Figure 13: Times Handled SDVF
3.2.3.4 Minutes in Line SDVF
The Minutes in Line SDVF is used to determine a value for the time passengers
wait while their bags are being screened before leaving them in the custody of the
screeners. While the group felt passengers do understand and appreciate the need for
security, their patience is not unlimited. Not waiting with the bags at all is the most
preferred and receives a value of 1.0. For each minute the passenger waits the value
decreases linearly up to 15 minutes or more when the value is 0.0.
Time in Line
1

Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

5

10

15

20

Minutes

Figure 14: Time in Line SDVF
3.2.4 Efficient Branch
The group desires a system with minimal impact to their staff while
accommodating for the various peak passenger flows. It is important that the checked
baggage system does not have bottlenecks or delays to the bag processing. Floor space is
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a limited resource that has become even more limited since the implementation of the
temporary checked baggage system. The screening machines are large; the machines and
queues take up this valuable floor space. In addition to the floor space, the delivery
method for the bags is an important issue for the airlines. The airlines value independent
make up rooms where the cleared bags are delivered. This allows the airlines to load
bags without the need to sort through bags traveling with other airlines. Figure 15
illustrates the sub-objectives that comprise the Efficient branch of the checked baggage
system hierarchy.
100 Percent
Checked Baggage
System

Passenger
Impact

Flow

Security

Efficient

Manpower

Ease of
Operation

Flexibility

Space

Figure 15: Efficient Branch
The definitions of the sub-objectives within this branch are provided in Table 4.
Table 4: Efficient Sub-objective Definitions
Efficient
Flow
Manpower
Space

Productive baggage system with minimal wasted
baggage flow, manpower, and space.
Throughput of the baggage with emphasis to avoid
congestion, bottlenecks, and interruption
Personnel fluctuations necessary to accommodate the
varying passenger load
Floor space of the airport required for the system
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There are four measures used for the Efficient branch tier sub-objectives. These
measures are shown in Figure 16.
100 Percent
Checked Baggage
System

Passenger
Impact

Efficient

Flow

Delivery
Time

Delivery
Method

Security

Manpower

Space

# of
Personnel

Floor
Space

Ease of
Operation

Flexibility

Figure 16: Efficient Branch with Measures
Table 5: Definitions of Efficient Measures
Measure
Delivery time (minutes)

Definition
The time the checked bag takes to get to
the make up room once it has been tag at
the airline desk and sent to be screened.
The level of sorting provided to the
Airlines when delivered to a Make up
room.
The change in number of operators
required to operate the baggage screening
system
The amount of floor space required from
the airport for the operation of the checked
baggage system.

Delivery Method
Personnel Fluctuation
Floor Space
(Square Feet)
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3.2.5 Efficient Branch SDVFs
The Efficient branch consists of four measures; Single Dimensional Value
Functions were developed for each by the study group. A brief description of each value
function is provided separately.
3.2.5.1 Delivery Time SDVF
The Delivery Time SDVF is one of the two value functions used for the flow subobjective. A system that can process bags from the point of being tagged to their arrival
at the make up room in seven minutes or less receives a value of 1.0. A system that
processes bags in 15 minutes or more receives a value of 0.0. The value for the time in
between decreases linearly. Fast delivery times are necessary to ensure enough time to
load bags without adversely affecting airlines departure times. This relationship is
illustrated in the Delivery Time SDVF in Figure 17. (It should be noted that the
maximum time will be airport dependent. Fifteen minutes was the desired maximum
time for Dayton International Airport.)

Delivery Time
1

Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
7

9

11

13

15

Minutes

Figure 17: Delivery Time SDVF
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3.2.5.2 Delivery Method SDVF
The Delivery Method SDVF assigns a value based on how a system delivers bags
to the airline make up rooms. The most preferred method is for the system to deliver
bags to individual airline make up rooms. This method receives a value of 1.0. The least
preferred method is for the system to deliver bags to a common make up room for
multiple airlines that requires airline baggage handlers to sort bags. That method receives
a value of 0.0. The second most preferred method is for the system to deliver bags to a
common make up room but which sorts the bags according to airline. This method
receives a value of 0.8. This function is illustrated in Figure 18.
Delivery Method
1.0
Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Separate Make Up
Room per Airline

Common Make Up
Room, sorted

Common Make Up
Room, not sorted

Figure 18: Delivery Method SDVF
3.2.5.3 Fluctuation of Personnel SDVF
The Fluctuation of Personnel SDVF captures a value based on the amount of
personnel changes necessary to accommodate varying passenger loads. A system that
requires a constant number of Personnel is the most preferred and receives a value of 1.0.
A system that requires minor fluctuations in personnel levels is the second most
preferred, receiving a value of 0.8. Minor fluctuations are variations of ten percent or
less. A system that requires major fluctuation in personnel is the least preferred and

39

receives a value of 0.0. Major fluctuations are personnel variations of more than 10
percent. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 19.
1
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Figure 19: Fluctuation of Personnel SDVF
3.2.5.4 Floor Space SDVF
The Floor Space SDVF provides a value based on the amount of terminal floor
space required to support the system. It is most preferred to have a system that requires
no terminal floor space, such a system would receive a value of 1.0. The second most
preferred system would take up no more floor space than currently available to conduct
baggage screening in the lobby area without changing the existing floor layout. That
system would receive a value of 0.5. The least preferred system would require more
floor space than is currently used and that system would receive a value of 0.0. This
relationship is illustrated in Figure 20.
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Value
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1.0
0.8
0.6
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0.2
0.0
Less

Same

More

Floor Space needed relative to existing
system

Figure 20: Floor Space SDVF
3.2.6 Security Branch
The vulnerability of the screening system is an important objective since a system
that is compromised forces manual bag clearing and thus severely impacts passenger
process times. In addition to the vulnerability, the capabilities of the equipment used for
the system are important. The capabilities of the equipment must meet minimum
standards prior to being certified by the FAA, however. There are different
manufacturers of equipment. The study group wants to ensure that the Dayton
International Airport uses equipment with the highest level of capabilities. These
capabilities include the equipment’s performance detecting known explosives, average
processing times, and maintenance performance based on fielded explosive systems in
operation. The Security sub-objectives as defined by the study group are illustrated in
Figure 21.
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Figure 21: Security Branch
The sub-objectives for the Security branch were defined based on the study
group’s interpretation of what is important with respect to Security. These definitions are
given in Table 6.
Table 6: Security Sub-objective Definitions
Security
Equipment Vulnerability
Equipment Capability
Isolation Capability
Alarm Resolution

Measures to prevent harm to passengers, personnel, and
resources supporting the checked baggage system
The accessibility of the system to those who intend
harm.
The ability of the screening system to detect explosives,
speed of processing bags, and reliability that the system
will be available.
The ability of the checked baggage system to separate a
bag from the baggage flow so as not to impede bag
processing.
Ability of the EDS machines integrated into the checked
baggage system to assist operators in determining
whether alerts of threat by screening machines are an
actual or false threat.

There are five lowest tier objectives for the Security branch. The Security branch of the
value hierarchy, with measures, is provided in Figure 22.
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Figure 22: Security Branch with Measures
The definitions of the measures for each of the Security Branch sub-objectives are
provided in Table 7.
Table 7: Definitions of Security Measures
Measure
Public Access

Definition
Can the passengers access the system
without the need for identification?
Percentage of known threats identified
correctly
The percentage of non threats incorrectly
identified as threats
Is the system capable of sending a bag
identified with a possible explosive to an
area that will not impede processing of
other bags?
How many alarms can be resolved by the
checked baggage system without the need
to manual clear the bags?

Catch Rate
False Alarm Rate
Isolation Capable

Online Performance
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3.2.7 Security Branch SDVFs
There are five Single Dimensional Value Functions that were developed for the
security branch.
3.2.7.1 Public Access SDVF
After discussing the issue, the group concluded that it is preferable that the system
not be accessible by the public. Specifically a system inside of the Security Identification
Display Area (SIDA) is the most preferred. The SIDA is an area of the airport that
requires cleared airport personnel and is therefore not accessible to the pubic. By securing
the baggage screening equipment in the SIDA, the machines are protected from
unauthorized tampering and the public has less exposure to unscreened bags. A system
that is not accessible to the Pubic receives a value of 1.0. A system that is accessible to
the public receives a value of 0.0. The Public Access SDVF is provided in Figure 23.
1.0

Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
No

Yes
Public Access?

Figure 23: Public Access SDVF
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3.2.7.2 Catch Rate SDVF
The Catch Rate SDVF converts a high score for a system that maximizes the
percentage of known threats that are identified correctly. Operational data could be
gathered for this measure based on how different explosive detection equipment performs
from Red Team inspections. Red Team inspections are periodic inspections performed
by the government to evaluate the effectiveness of the screening machines and operators
at detecting bags with actual threats. By collecting this data, a proxy is developed for the
machine catch rate. If the data were to show different types of equipment had differing
average catch rates in various operational settings, the data may help identify potential
improvements. The minimal acceptable catch rate is prescribed by TSA. Any catch rate
higher than the required minimum would gain value on this exponential SDVF.
1

Value

0
Minimum Catch Rate
per FAA certification-

% Gap Closed between Min and Max

100 %.

Figure 24: Catch Rate SDVF
Table 8: Data for Catch Rate SDVF
Percent of the Gap between Minimum Catch Rate
(Certified by FAA) and 100 Percent
0
50
100
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Value
0.00
0.66
1.00

3.2.7.3 False Alarm Rate SDVF
The False Alarm Rate SDVF uses the percentage of items incorrectly identified as
threats to define a value for equipment capability. A false alarm rate of 0 has a value of
1.0. As the percentage of false alarms approaches 100 percent the value decreases
exponentially as illustrated in Figure 25. As with the Catch Rate SDVF, operational data
should be used for this measure if made available by the government.
1

Value

0
0.

False Alarm Rate (Percent)

Max Acceptable by FAA.

Figure 25: False Alarm Rate SDVF
Table 9: Data for False Alarm Rate SDVF
False Alarm (Percent)
0
25
100

Value
1.00
0.25
0.00

3.2.7.4 Isolation Capable SDVF
It is preferred for a baggage screening system to be capable of isolating bags that
are identified as a threat. This isolation capability allows the bag to received additional
screening while allowing other bags to continue in the system without being hindered. A
system that is capable of isolating bags receives a value of 1.0 and a system that does not
have isolation capability receives a value of 0.0. The Isolation Capable SDVF is
provided in Figure 26.
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Figure 26: Isolation Capable SDVF
3.2.7.5 Online Performance SDVF
The Online Performance SDVF uses the percent of alarms that can be resolved
within the screening machines to define a value for alarm resolution. The higher the
percentage of alarms handled within the machines without requiring hand searches the
better. The Online Performance SDVF is provided in Figure 27 and the data points used
to generate this Figure is provided in Table 10.
1

Value

0
0.

Online Performance Resolution (Percent)

100.

Figure 27: Online Performances SDVF
Table 10: Data Points for Online Performance SDVF
% of Alarms
Resolved within EDS
0
15
30
60
100
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Value
0.0
0.10
0.50
0.90
1.00

3.2.8 Ease of Operation Branch
The Ease of Operation objective is the fourth fundamental objective in the
hierarchy. There are four lowest tier objectives for the Ease of Operation branch. The
Ease of Operation branch is provided in Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Ease of Operation Branch
The definitions for each of these sub-objectives as defined by the study team are
provided in Table 8.
Table 11: Ease of Operation Sub-objective Definitions
Ease of Operation
Safety
Comfort
Maintainability / Availability
Reliability

The safety and comfort for the operators of the
baggage screening system along with the
maintainability, availability, and reliability.
Application of engineering and management
principles, criteria, and techniques to avoid harm to
operators of the system.
Condition or feeling of pleasurable ease, well-being,
and contentment.
The probability that a failed system will be repaired
The probability that the system will perform as
required when operated within its operational limits

Four measures were developed to correspond to the lowest tier sub-objectives for the
Ease of Operation branch. This branch, with measures, is provided in Figure 29.
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Figure 29: Ease of Operation Branch with Measures
The definitions of these measures defined by the study group are provided in Table 12.
Table 12: Definitions of Ease of Operation Measures
Measure
# Features above Minimum Required, Safety
# Features above Minimum Required, Comfort
Average Repair Time
Number of Breakdowns

Definition
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) minimum
safety features
Additional features included to system
such as cushioned chairs, fans, etc.
The time in hours that repairs on the
system take
The number of breakdown in addition
to the normally scheduled maintenance
downtime

3.2.9 Ease of Operation SDVFs
The Ease of Operation Branch consists of four measures; Single Dimensional
Value Functions for the each by the study group. A brief description of each value
function is provided separately.
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3.2.9.1 Number of Safety Features SDVF
It is desirable to have a checked baggage system with safety features over and
above the required features. The TSA and OSHA stipulate required safety features.
These required features would serve as the minimum. While clearly valued, these items
would receive a score of zero on the measure as it captures additional features. Such
features can take any form. For example this could include items such as conveyor shut
down switches that isolate portions of the baggage systems while allowing other parts of
the conveyor to continue operating. This SDVF is categorical, scoring value for each
item above the required minimum features. The increase SDVF is in Figure 30
1.0

Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0

1

2

3

4

5 or more

# of Safety Features

Figure 30: Number of Safety Features SDVF
3.2.9.2 Number of Comfort Features SDVF
It is desirable to have a checked baggage system with comfort features over and
above the minimum. The required comfort features stipulated by TSA would serve as the
minimum. While clearly valued, these items would receive a score of zero on this
measure items as it captures additional features. Such features can take any form. For
example this could include items such as screening system monitors with reduced glare to
reduce eye strain and will lead to more attentive operators. This SDVF is categorical,
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scoring value for each item above the required minimum features. The increase SDVF is
in Figure 31
1.0

Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0

1
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3

4

5 or more

# of Comfort Features

Figure 31: Number of Comfort Features SDVF
3.2.9.3 Time to Repair SDVF
The study group believes it is desirable to have a system with the minimum
average repair time. In the case of unscheduled maintenance problems it is important to
get the system back up in less than 1 hour in order to minimize the disruption to the
passenger and bag flow. A repair that takes more than 24 hours is considered
unacceptable and would receive a value of 0.0. This SDVF is categorical. The most
preferred repair time of 1 hour or less receives a value of 1.0 and as the repair takes
longer the value decreases incrementally. The Time to Repair SDVF is in Figure 32.

Value

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Less
than 1
hour

1 to 8
hours

8 to 24
hours

more
than 24
hours

Time to Repair (Avg)

Figure 32: Time to Repair SDVF
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3.2.9.4 Number of Breakdowns SDVF
The Number of Breakdowns SDVF provides a value for the Reliability subobjective. Based on the average number of system breakdowns that occur within a
maintenance cycle a value is assigned. The maintenance cycle is defined as 30 days. A
system that averages no breakdowns within the maintenance cycle receives a value of
1.0. As the average number of breakdowns increases the value given for the SDVF
decreases. A system with 3 or more breakdowns on average per month is considered
unacceptable and receives a value of 0.0. This SDVF is provided in Figure 33.

System Breakdown

Value

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0

1

2

3 or more

Times System Down per MX Cycle

Figure 33: Number of Breakdowns SDVF

3.2.10 Flexibility Branch
The Flexibility objective is the fifth first tier sub-objective. The Flexibility
Branch consists of three sub-objectives. The Flexibility Branch is expanded in Figure 34.
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Figure 34: Flexibility Branch
The definitions described by the study group for these Flexibility sub-objectives are
provided in Table 10.
Table 13: Flexibility Objective Definitions
Flexibility

The capability of adapting to new, different, or
changing requirements
Holds up well under exceptional conditions
Capable of increasing the size of scope of the system
in the future
Operation or control of a process performed by
equipment rather than manually

Robustness
Expandable
Automation

There are six lowest tier objectives for the Flexibility branch. This branch, with measures
is provided in Figure 35.
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Figure 35: Flexibility Branch With Measures

53

Routing /
Divert

Sorting

The definitions developed for the Flexibility sub-objective measures are provided in
Table 11.
Table 14: Flexibility Measure Definitions
Measure
Conveyor Redundancies

Definition
How many back up measures are available
on the conveyor system in case of a
conveyor breakdown?
How many back up detection systems are
available to screen bags identified as
threats?
Can the system be expanded to take a
larger passenger load?
Is the system capable of tracking bags with
identification such as bar code?
Is the system capable of routing and
diverting bags automatically?
How does the system sort the passenger
bags to make up Areas?

Detection Redundancies
Expandable
Scanning
Routing / Divert
Sort to Airline Make Up

3.2.11.1 Conveyor Redundancy SDVF
The Conveyor Redundancy SDVF is one of two value function for the Robustness
sub-objective. It is desirable for the checked baggage system to have redundant ability.
The conveyor system may have to be shut down to perform maintenance or clear jammed
bags. It is preferred to have a system that is capable of moving bags on alternate
conveyor routes to avoid bag process delays or the requirement for the manual transfer of
bags. The most preferred realistic number of redundant conveyor system is 3 or more for
the Dayton International Airport. The least preferred option is for the checked baggage
system to have no redundant conveyor systems. This SDVF is provided in Figure 36
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Figure 36: Conveyor Redundancy SDVF
3.2.11.2 Detection Redundancy SDVF
It is desirable to have a checked baggage systems that has multiple automated
layers of detection abilities. The Detection Redundancy SDVF is the second value
function used for the Robustness sub-objective. It is used to assign a value based on the
number of redundant detection capabilities built into the system. A system that has 3 or
more redundant detection features receives a value of 1.0.
1.0

Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0

1

2

3 or more

Redundancy in Detection

Figure 37: Detection Redundancy SDVF
3.2.11.3 Expandable SDVF
It is most preferred to have a checked baggage system that can be expanded to
take on a larger passenger load accommodating any expansion in passenger loads and air
carriers. The Expandable SDVF assigns a value of 1.0 for a system that is able to
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accommodate additional airlines should the airport expand the number of airlines. This
value function is provided in Figure 38.

1.0
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Expandable

Figure 38: Expandable SDVF
This next group of measures captures the value of various automated effects. The
highest value would be gained by an automated process for all three of these factors.
However, the separate measures capture the ability to add certain of these automated
functions separately from the others.
3.2.11.4 Tracking SDVF
It is preferred to have a checked baggage system that is capable of tracking bags
in the screening process and can tell where a checked bag is located. The Tracking
SDVF assigns a value of 1.0 for a system that automatically tracks checked bags and
assigns a value of 0.0 for a system that is not capable of tracking automatically. This
SDVF is provided in Figure 39.
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Figure 39: Tracking SDVF
3.2.11.5 Routing / Divert SDVF
The study group prefers a checked baggage system is capable of automatically
routing and diverting bags. Such automated handling reduces personnel needs and, when
properly implemented, provides better service than manual handling.

1.0

Value

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
No

Yes

Route Divert Capable

Figure 40: Routing Divert SDVF
3.2.11.6 Sorting SDVF
The Sorting SDVF is the third value function for the Automation sub-objective. It
used to assign a value of 1.0 for a system that is capable of automatically sorting bags to
airline make up rooms.
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Figure 41: Sorting SDVF
The Checked Baggage System Hierarchy includes 23 measures used to assess
how well potential 100 percent checked baggage system alternatives provide what was
deemed important by the study group. Several of these measures will require data that
was not available to the study group at the time. However these were deemed important
enough to be included.

3.3.1 Decompose Cost
The study group identified three areas of concern for cost. These areas were
identified during the affinity diagram process used to define the objectives for the
checked baggage system hierarchy. The cost areas were developed into three subobjectives. The first is the cost associated with the Personnel required to operate the
system. The second sub-objective is the cost associated with the type of construction
required to support the checked baggage system. The third is the cost from acquisitions
to support the checked baggage system such as a conveyor system used to move and
transfer bags through screening machines. The definitions for these sub-objectives are
provided in Table 15.
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Table 15: Cost Objective Definitions
Expenditure of time, money, and resources to
The personnel necessary to operate the system
The level of construction necessary to install the
system.
The purchases made for a system which includes
conveyor systems, display monitors.

Cost
People
Infrastructure
Acquisition

The cost hierarchy with measures is provided in Figure 42.
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Figure 42: Cost Hierarchy with Measures
The definitions of these measures as defined by the study group are listed in Table 16.
Table 16: Cost Objective Definitions
Measure
# of People

Definition
The number of operators required to run
and maintain the system.
Type of construction required to support
the new system.
The net present value of the system over its
anticipated lifecycle.

Level of Work
Cost of System
3.3.2.1 Personnel SDVF

The Personnel SDVF uses the number of operators required for the system per
shift to define a value for personnel. The most preferred number of operators is 3 which
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receives a value of 1.0. The least preferred is 10 or more operators which receives a
value of 0. The value decreases linearly as the number of operators increases from 3 to
10.
1.00

Value

0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12

# of Operators

Figure 43: Personnel SDVF
3.3.2.2 Level of Construction SDVF
The Level of Construction SDVF is used to obtain a value for the amount of
construction necessary to install the checked baggage screening system. A system that
can be installed without construction to the facility is most preferred and receives a value
of 1.0. A system that requires minor work includes work such as the movement of nonload bearing walls and renovations within the existing footprint of the facilities receives a
value of 0.5. A system that requires major work includes such work as the movement of
load bearing walls, reinforcement of floor to increase loading capability, and renovations
that expand the existing footprint of the facilities receives a value of 0.0.
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Figure 44: Level of Infrastructure SDVF
3.3.2.3 Acquisition SDVF
The Acquisition SDVF is used to assign a value based on the net present value
(NPV) of conveyor systems, facility modifications, and construction to support the
system. Note that this cost is exclusive of the cost of the EDS machines. These
machines are not currently a cost incurred by the Dayton International Airport. A system
that will not incur any cost to the Airport for these items is the most preferred and
receives a value of 1.0. A system that requires 1.5 Million dollars (NPV) or more is the
least preferred and receives a value of 0.0. As the cost for these items moves from zero
dollars to 1.5 Million dollars (NPV) the value decreases linearly. This SDVF is
illustrated in Figure 45.
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Figure 45: Acquisition SDVF
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2

3.4 Step 5: Weight the Hierarchy
The hierarchies consist of several different objectives which are not of equal
importance. It is necessary to weight the hierarchy from the decision maker’s
perspective. The direct weight method, discussed in Chapter 2, was used to weight the
hierarchy. The weighting for the hierarchy was performed by two members of the
Director of Aviations staff. Both were members of the study team and were familiar with
the hierarchies, measures, and value functions already defined.
3.4.1 Weights for 100 percent checked baggage system
The weights were elicited using the direct weighting method. Weights were
assigned locally within each branch of the hierarchy. The 100 percent checked baggage
system hierarchy is provided in Figure 46. Starting with the lowest tier of the hierarchy,
which are the measures, each measure was weighted based on its relative importance to
the other measures used for the same sub-objective. If only one measure was used for a
sub-objective it received 100 percent of the weight (100 marbles). If a sub-objective had
more than one measure, for example two measures, the decision makers compared the
importance one measure in terms of the other. If one measure was determined to be
twice as important as the other then the more important measure would receive 66
marbles while the less important measure would receive 33 marbles. Weights were
assigned locally beginning with the Passenger Impact Branch moving to the right for the
remaining four branches. Weights for the Passenger Impact Branch are provided in
Figure 46. After weights were assigned within each Branch the Branches, first tier
objectives of the overall hierarchy were given weights using the same 100 marble direct
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weight method. The weight assigned to the other four branches of the 100 percent
checked baggage hierarchy are provided in Appendix A.
3.4.1 Weight Checked Baggage System Hierarchy Local
There are a total of 23 measures for the Checked Baggage System Hierarchy.
These measures, displayed below their corresponding sub-objectives, are used to attain
how well an alternative meets the objectives defined in the hierarchy. The decision
maker provided weights within each branch. Therefore the weights the decision makers
assigned to the measures represent the importance of the measures within each branch of
the hierarchy. These weights for the lowest tier of each branch sums to 1.0.
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Figure 46: Checked Baggage System Hierarchy

3.4.2 Weight Checked Baggage System Hierarchy Global
The global weight for each measure is calculated by multiplying the local weight
given to the sub-objectives and weight of each objective located above that measure until
the fundamental objective is reached. The global weights for the 23 measures in the 100
Percent Checked Baggage System Hierarchy must sum to one. These weights represent
the importance that each measure has to the fundamental objective as assigned by the
decision maker. The 100 Percent Checked Baggage System Hierarchy global weights are
provided in Figure 47.

100 Percent
Checked Baggage
System

Passenger
Impact

Efficient
.25

Ease of
Operation

Security
.17

.13

Flexibility
.20

Figure 47: Checked Baggage System Hierarchy First Tier Weights

The Passenger Impact and Flexibility tier objectives received 0.25 of the weight
each. They were deemed the most important to the Director of Aviation. The Ease of
Operation objective was given a weight of 0.20. The Efficient objective was given a
weight of 0.17. The Security objective was given a weight of 0.13. Security was given
the least weight but this is not because security is not important. The security objectives
provide value to capabilities above and beyond the minimum accepted criteria of the
FAA and TSA. These minimum accepted standards are considered stringent. Therefore
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.25

the other objectives were given more weight. The Passenger Impact and Flexibility
objectives were given the most weight because they were seen as the most important to
the passengers and the ability to accommodate various passenger loads. The Ease of
Operation objective was given more weight than the Efficient objective because the
standards for the workers were deemed as more important than the Efficient objectives.

3.4.3 Weights for Cost
The direct weighting method was also used to weight the cost hierarchy. Since
this hierarchy is small in size, (only includes three measures), both the local and global
weights are provided in Figure 48.
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Figure 48: Cost Hierarchy with Weights
3.5 Summary
This chapter covered in detail the creation of a value hierarchy for a 100 percent
checked baggage system from the perspective of the Director of Aviation at Dayton
International Airport. This is coupled with a “cost hierarchy” which captures the cost of

66

such a system. The characteristics valued by the stakeholders also provide guidance to
system designers. These values clearly delineate design preferences of the stakeholders.
The model is now available to the Dayton International Airport, or any other airport that
wishes to adopt it. Chapter 4, using a notional example, illustrates how alternatives may
be analyzed once they are developed.
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Chapter 4. Data Collection & Analysis of Results
The 100 percent checked baggage and cost hierarchies developed during the
previous five steps were done so through a series of five group meetings with the
integrated study team. The minutes from all group meetings are provided in Appendix B.
During a sixth meeting, the Dayton International Airport team members discussed
alternatives to use to illustrate the validity of using these hierarchies to evaluate and
compare potential checked baggage system hierarchy. Dayton International Airport has
an interim system in place that met the requirement for 100 percent screening of checked
baggage. The study group is interested in maximizing the value obtained in a checked
baggage system. Therefore the group desired to use the current system as one alternative.
The group provided several of their desired preferences throughout the model
development process. These preferences were used to develop a notional example to
provide a comparison.

4.1 Step 6 Alternative Generation
At this point of the VFT process, alternatives are generated with the intent of
meeting the objectives defined in the two hierarchies. Several alternatives should be used
to provide comparison for how each meets the objectives formed in the hierarchies. For
this research two notional alternatives were used for illustrative purposes, the current
Terminal floor system and a Hypothetical Inline system. The Terminal floor system,
along with this notional Inline system, was used to demonstrate the concepts for the
baggage system and cost hierarchies. The notional alternative is an inline system which
is integrated into a baggage handling conveyor system.
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4.1.1 Terminal Floor System – Interim as of 31 December 2002
This interim system consists of the placement of EDS and Explosive Trace
Detection machines in the airport lobby directly in front of the airline ticket check in
counters. This was used to meet the mandate for 100 percent screening. This system did
not require facility modifications or construction.
4.1.2 Hypothetical System, (Inline System)
The Hypothetical System alternative is roughly based on the preferences gathered
from the study group meetings. This is an inline system integrated into a baggage
handling system. This system allows passengers to leave their checked bags in the
custody of the Airlines after check-in. The bags are then transferred through the
explosive screening machines and process via a conveyor system directly to the airline
make up rooms. Again, it should be noted that this is a hypothetical system, whose
scores are notional.

4.2 Step 7 Alternative Scoring
Scoring of the alternatives is typically performed by first gathering data needed
for each of the hierarchy measures defined for the lowest tier objectives. This may
involve historic data, operational parameters or expert opinion. The single dimensional
value functions are then used to obtain a value score of each measure.
4.2.1 Checked Baggage System
The notional data used in this illustration for both the current system and
hypothetical system are provided in Table 17.
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Table 17: Checked Baggage System Hierarchy Notional Data
Branch

Measure Title

Terminal Floor
System

Inline System

Visible System
Distance
# of Times
Minutes in Line

Yes
30 ft
1
7 minutes

Yes
0 ft
0
0 minutes

Delivery Time

10
separate make up
room by airline

10
separate make up
room by airline

minor
Same

none
Less

Public Access
Catch Rate
False Alarm Rate
Isolation Capable
Online Performance

Yes
0
0
No
0

No
0
0
Yes
0

OSHA Features
Comfort Features
Average Repair
Time
Number
breakdowns

1
1

1
1

Less than 1 hour

Less than 1 hour

0

0

0

1

1
Yes
No
No
No

1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Passenger Impact

Efficient
Delivery Method
Personnel
Fluctuation
Floor Space
Security

Ease of Operation

Flexibility
Conveyor
Redundancies
Detection
Redundancies
Expandable
Scanning
Routing
Sort to Airline
4.2.2 Cost Hierarchy
The notional cost data used for the measures in the cost hierarchy for both the
Terminal Floor System and Hypothetical system alternatives are provided in Table 15.
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The number of personnel data was provided from the study group based their experience
with the current system operation as well as that expected from an inline system that is
integrated into an automated baggage handling system. The current system required no
work on the airport infrastructure. The hypothetical system would require significant
work on the infrastructure due to the fact that there is not enough room behind the airline
ticket counter for an inline system. The current system required no acquisition costs.
The study group estimated, based on their experience, that the inline system would
require approximately $1.5M in acquisition for a conveyor system. A summary of this
notional data is provided in Table 18.

Table 18: Cost Hierarchy Notional Data
Branch

Measure Title

Terminal Floor
System

Inline System

Number of
Personnel

8

3

Level of Work

None

Major

NPV for System

$0

$1.5M

Personnel
Infrastructure
Acquisition

4.3 Step 8 Deterministic Analysis
Deterministic Analysis uses the additive value function to obtain an overall score
for each alternative. The global weights assigned by the decision maker for each of the
measures are multiplied by the value obtained from the measures’ SDVF. These
calculations were carried out using the Logical Decisions for Windows Version 5.114
software. The Dayton International Airport model had previously been set-up in the
Logical Decisions software as the earlier steps were completed.
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4.3.1 Checked Baggage System Hierarchy
The checked baggage system hierarchy included 23 measures. The additive value
function obtains an overall score for an alternative by adding the global weight for each
measure multiplied by the value obtained by that measures value function. The best
possible score for an alternative is 1.0. The scores for each alternative are provided in
Figure 49. This figure also provides a visual display for each of the five branches within
the hierarchy.

Alternative

Score

Max Attainable Score Alternative
Hypothetical System (Inline System)
Terminal Floor System

Passenger Impact
Efficient

Flexibility
Security

1.000
0.815
0.558

Ease of Operation

Figure 49: Alternative Rankings for Checked Baggage System Hierarchy
The notional Inline System clearly scored higher than the Terminal Floor System
for four of the branches in this example. The two alternatives received the same score for
the Ease of Operation branch as both used the same assumptions. With the same
illustrative data used; their scores were expected to be the same. The software allows
comparison charts such as in Figure 49 to be developed for any tier or branch tier of the
hierarchy.
4.3.2 Cost Hierarchy
The cost hierarchy included 3 measures. The notional scores for each alternative
for cost are provided in Figure 50. This figure also provides a breakout for each of the
three objectives of the hierarchy.
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COST
Alternative
Max Attainable Score
T erminal Floor System
Inline system

Infrastructure

Score
1.000
0.875
0.150

Acquisition

Personnel

Figure 50: Alternative Rankings for Cost Hierarchy

The Terminal Floor System scored better for both the Infrastructure and
Acquisition objectives. The Hypothetical System scored better for the Personnel
objective. Overall, the Terminal Floor System is preferred on the cost hierarchy.
4.3.3 Cost / Benefit Comparison
The most preferred checked baggage system would score a 1.0 for both the
checked baggage system hierarchy and the cost hierarchy. However, it is unlikely an
alternative could capture a maximum score of 1.0 from both hierarchies. A system that
scores high for the checked baggage system hierarchy may be more costly, perhaps
requiring construction or higher acquisition costs. Figure 51 illustrates the tradeoffs
involved between the benefit and cost.
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1.000

Terminal
Floor
System,
0.558, 0.875

Cost

0.800
0.600
0.400

Hypothetical
Inline
System,
0.815, 0.150

0.200
0.000
0.000

Maximum,
1.000, 1.000

0.200

0.400

0.600

0.800

1.000

Benefit

Figure 51: Cost Benefit Plot
The cost and benefit scores for both of the notional alternatives have been plotted
in Figure 51. The Inline System scored very low on cost (0.150) while achieving a high
benefit score (0.815) (It should be noted that a low cost score is undesirable.). An
alternative such as the Inline System achieves a good score for the checked baggage
hierarchy because it is automated, manpower efficient, and provides a high level of
customer convenience. However it will require acquisition and infrastructure
modifications costs which causes it to receive a lower score for cost. The Terminal Floor
System receives higher marks in the opposite manner, high score for cost and a low score
for benefit. Additionally alternatives could be evaluated in this manner to provide a
means of differentiating between systems that score relatively the same for the benefit but
receive different cost scores. The ultimate decision makers will need to determine their
preferences or trade-off between these costs and benefits.

4.4 Step 9 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity Analysis was performed on each of the first tier objectives to illustrate
weight sensitivity. Questions often arise on the weighting. The one way sensitivity
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analysis changes the weight of one objective while holding the proportion of the weights
among the remaining objectives. If the choice is insensitive to a weight change,
discussion of the weight is usually curtailed. If the choice is sensitive to the weights, this
suggests careful study of the weight.
4.4.1 Checked Baggage System Hierarchy
Sensitivity analysis determined that in this simple illustrative example, the
Hypothetical System was dominant for each objective. An example of sensitivity
analysis performed on the Passenger Impact objective illustrates this finding in Figure 52.
The decision maker gave Passenger Impact a weight of 0.25. Regardless of the weight
assigned to Passenger Impact, the value for the Inline System is the higher of the two
alternatives. The same held true for the other measures. Again, such analysis can be
carried out at any tier of the hierarchy.
Best

Inline sy stem
Interim Sy stem - Current

Value

W orst
0

25

100

50

P ercent of Weight on Passenger Im pact Goal

Figure 52: Passenger Impact Branch Sensitivity Analysis
4.4.2 Cost Hierarchy
Sensitivity analysis determined that that two of the three cost sub-objectives were
insensitive to weight changes. Regardless of the change in weight for either the

75

Infrastructure or Acquisition objectives, the Terminal Floor System has the highest score.
It was shown that the Personnel objective was sensitive to the change in weight. As
shown in Figure 53, if there were questions on the Personnel weight, the decision will not
change until the weight increases from its present value of 15% to 55% or higher. This
would indicate insensitivity to the personnel weight, suggesting that short of a complete
re-weighting, the Terminal Floor System will remain the preferred choice on cost (but not
benefit).
Personnel
Best

Hypothetical System (Inline system)
Max Attainable Score
Terminal Floor System

Score

Worst
0

15

100

55
Percent of Weight

Figure 53: Personnel Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity Analysis was performed on each first tier objective of both hierarchies.
The Analysis using the notional alternatives illustrated that the Hypothetical Inline
System was insensitive to weights. Therefore regardless of the weighting used to weight
the Checked Baggage System Hierarchy the rankings would not change. A similar
conclusion can be drawn for the Sensitivity Analysis performed on the Cost Hierarchy
except for the Terminal System alternative. The weights would have to be dramatically
changed in order to change the alternative ranking for the Cost Hierarchy. Such an
analysis helps focus where more detailed discussion of the weights may be required. In
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the small, notional example, the decisions on benefit and cost are insensitive to the
weighting.
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Chapter 5. Findings & Conclusions

5.1 Overview
The Dayton International Airport, along with the rest of the commercial airports
in the nation, was mandated to implement 100 percent screening of checked baggage with
explosive detection systems by 31 December 2002. Prior to this mandate, the FAA goal
for 100 percent checked baggage screening was 2009. A longer design process, with the
involvement of the airport stakeholders, would be desirable to design and implement a
solution that would best meet the security requirements while maximizing efficiency and
minimizing any negative impacts to the stakeholders. The time was not available before
implementing an interim solution. With the security requirements mitigated, Dayton
International Airport has the time to evaluate potential long term solutions for a 100
percent checked baggage system. Value Focused Thinking was used to develop a value
model to assist in the evaluation of potential checked baggage system alternatives. This
methodology enabled the study group consisting of Dayton International Airport
stakeholders to create a value model with the objectives they found to be most important
for a 100 percent checked baggage system. The model developed will allow the airport
to make decisions based on these objectives.
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5.2 Value Model Strengths
The value hierarchy developed in this study was created by eliciting critical
objectives of the Dayton International Airport stakeholders. The integrated study team,
consisting of five key stakeholders from the Airport Operations Staff, Airlines, and TSA
met on six different occasions as a group to develop 23 measures and value functions for
a Checked Baggage System Hierarchy. The study team also developed 3 measures and
value functions for a Cost Hierarchy. These stakeholders provided their valuable insight
and expertise and ultimately spent more than 150 man-hours to complete the
development of this model.

This hierarchy can be used to assist the Dayton

International Airport stakeholders in making a better informed and defendable decision
that could ultimately lead to higher levels of efficiency and passenger convenience then
currently provided by the airport’s checked baggage system.
This is the first documented use of VFT to assist airports in the selection of
potential long term solutions for 100 percent checked baggage systems.

5.3 Value Model Weaknesses
The value model requires some data not available during this research for to
provide a more meaningful comparison of potential alternatives. These three measures
do, however, suggest future data requirements for the TSA and others to consider. The
study did not compare real world alternatives. The value functions used in this study
were developed with deterministic or point estimates for the measure scores. These point
estimates do not take into account the uncertainty and risk involved in decision making.
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5.4 Conclusion
The research has shown that a value model could be developed to aid Dayton
International Airport in evaluating potential long term solutions for a 100 percent
checked baggage system. A hypothetical checked baggage system was developed that
provided more value than the current checked baggage system in use at airport. The
study provides insight about the value of the current system including the identification
of value gaps where the current system could be improved.

5.5 Recommendations for Future Work
Follow up research could be conducted with Dayton International Airport to
gather data and incorporate it into the model’s measures and value functions. A model
with complete data could provide additional insight into how to select the best 100
percent checked baggage system. The value model could be used to tailor requests for
bid proposals to provide design packages for a checked baggage system. This decision
aid could be modified and used as a decision aid for stakeholders from other airports
within the United States faced with the same problem.
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Appendix A: Local Weights by Branch

Efficient

Security

Ease of
Operation

Flexibility
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100 Percent
Checked Baggage
System

Passenger
Impact

1.0

.25

Space

.25

# of
Personnel

1.0

Floor
Space

Manpower
.50

.35

# of
Times

Flow

Delivery
Time
.65

Figure A 1: Efficient Branch with Local Weights

Passenger
Impact

1.0

Isolatio
n
Capable

.20

Isolation
Capability

Checked
Baggage System

Security

.60

False
Alarm
Rate

.50

Equipment
Capability

Catch
Rate
.40

Ease of
Operation

Alarm
Resolution

Online
Perform ance

1.0

.20

Flexibility

82

Efficient

.10

Equipment
Vulnerability

Public
Access
1.0

Figure A 2: Security Branch with Local Weights

Passenger
Impact
Efficient

Checked
Baggage System

.10

Comfort

Ease of
Operation

1.0

Breakdown

System

Reliability

Flexibility

Maintainability
Availability
.40

Repair
Time

.10

# of
Features
above Min

1.0

Avg

1.0

.40

83

Security

Safety

Features
above
OSHA
min.

1.0

Figure A 3: Ease of Operation Branch with Local Weights

Passenger
Impact
Efficient

Ease of
Operation

Flexibility

1.0

.20

Scanning

.40

Automation

Catch Rate

.30

.40

False
Alarm Rate

.30
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Checked
Baggage System

Security

Expandable
.40

Detection
Redundancy

.60

Expandable

Robustness

Convey or
Redundancy

.40

Figure A 4: Flexibility Branch with Local Weights

Appendix B: Integrated Study Team Minutes
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY
INITIAL MEETING MINUTES 10 DEC 2002
TIME: 0900-1030
PLACE: Dayton International Airport Operations, 5th Floor Conference Room
ATTENDEES:
Capt Stephen Chambal, AFIT
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT
Mr. Jon Vrabel, Dayton International Airport, Operations
Mr. Doug Warner, Dayton International Airport, Facilities
Mr. Dave Mason, Dayton International Airport, Chief Engineer
Mr. Ronnie Wayne, Delta Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport
Mr. Bob Hall, Continental Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer
Mr. Jerry Witt, TSA, Dayton International Airport
Mr. Ray Muench, UNISYS, IT Engineer
PURPOSE:
Introduce Value Focused Thinking (VFT), a decision analysis methodology and an
application of VFT for Dayton International Airport’s long term solution for a 100%
checked baggage system. Appoint team members from interested stakeholders for an
integrated study team (IST). Set first meeting for IST to begin work on a value
hierarchy.
OPENING DISCUSION:
All attendees introduced themselves. Dr. Deckro provided an overview briefing on the
VFT methodology. Capt Chambal discussed real world applications of VFT for a
classified information system at the Air Force Technical Applications Center and the Air
Force Force Protection Battlelab. Capt Meade introduced the focus of this study; Dayton
International Airport’s checked baggage system.
INTRODUCTION AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
All attendees were given an opportunity to ask questions about the VFT methodology and
scope of the study for the Dayton International Airport’s baggage system.
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Ronnie Wayne expressed concern about human factors, focus on passengers, and
providing options to an in-line system. Regardless of the system to be used there will be
some level of human involvement. An example would be an employee at the end of the
baggage system that becomes ill and as a result is unable to keep the system from backing
up. The law requires the security measures but the airports are in place to serve the
passengers (customers) and its imperative to keep them as satisfied as possible. The
study should include the perceptions of the passengers. Additionally, the study shouldn’t
be limited to that of an-line system but instead focus on the values important in a checked
baggage system.
Jerry Witt asked if the group from AFIT had clearances to view classified and sensitive
documents. Dr. Deckro stated that the AFIT members have security clearances at no less
than the Secret level.
Bob Hall pointed out that the literature review references presented on slide 23 of the
briefing did not include Title 49 CFR parts 1540 and 1544.
Youseff Elzein stated that this study should be complete prior to selecting the best layout
for the checked baggage system. Several consultants are available to prepare alternatives
and two have already been prepared.
Dave Mason stated that the timeline of the study and that of checked baggage system are
separate. The set up of the checked baggage system will not be dependant upon the
completion of this study. The results of the study can be used to aid in a long term
solution of the airport’s checked baggage system.
Ronnie Wayne asked about the possibility of one or more of the AFIT group to get a
badge for unescorted access in the airport. After some discussion as to the time it
normally takes to complete the paperwork, Capt Meade agreed to get a badge.
Members for the IST were appointed as follows:
IST members:
Capt Quincy Meade, Capt Stephen Chambal, Dick Deckro
John Thomas, David Meek
Jon Vrabal, Youseff Elzein, Doug Warner
Bob Hall
Ronnie Wayne

AFIT
TSA
Dayton International Airport
Continental
Delta

OPEN ITEMS:
The next meeting for the IST was not set at the meeting. All parties generally agreed that
the best times for a meeting would be Tuesdays to Thursdays. Capt Meade is
responsible for coordinating the next meeting date and time and will contact all parties.
Capt Meade will arrange individual meetings with the IST members in advance of our
first group meeting to be scheduled after 6 JAN 03.
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #2, 14 JAN 03
TIME: 1300-1600
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Business Traveler Conference Room
ATTENDEES:
Capt Stephen Chambal, AFIT
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT
Mr. Jon Vrabel, Dayton International Airport, Operations
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer
Mr. Dave Mason, Dayton International Airport, Chief Engineer
Mr. Doug Warner, Dayton International Airport, Facilities
Mr. Bob Hall, Continental Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport
PURPOSE:
Begin the development of the 100% checked baggage system value hierarchy. Complete
the first tier of the hierarchy and continue breaking down first tier objectives.
OPENING DISCUSSION:
The minutes of the previous meeting were discussed. The research timeline was
introduced with the following items.
Develop and Verify Hierarchy
Develop Measures
Weight Hierarchy
Score and Analyze Options

14 JAN 03
TBD
TBD
TBD

Dates were not provided at the time in order to arrange for another group meeting time
that will accommodate all the team members. Wednesdays at 1pm appear to be the best
time to meet as a complete group.
A first tier example for a 100% checked baggage system was provided to begin group
discussion. The group then began building an affinity diagram to develop the value
hierarchy.
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ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
The first tier of the value hierarchy was developed by brainstorming the most important
values to the group members. Each member of the study group provided the objectives
most important to them in a 100 percent checked baggage system. Each item was
recorded and then grouped into common headings using an Affinity diagram. These main
headings became the first tier objectives. These first tier objectives are:
Passenger Impact
Efficiency
Flexibility
Security
Reliability
Cost
The Affinity Diagram inputs are as follows:
FLEXIBILITY
Impact on airline staff
Work within the environment
Re-routing
Personnel
Location
Back up
Technology
Shut down procedures
For breaks and hits
Upgradeability
Expandability
Scalability
Operationally

The following was discussed for the first tier objective, Flexibility.
The impact on the airline staff is an issue. It’s desirable to have a system that will not
result in a requirement for airline personnel to handle problems associated with damaged,
lost, or misrouted bags.
The system must work within the environment. The airport was designed and built prior
to the requirement for the 100% checked baggage system. Therefore it’s important that
the long term solution is built in a manner that works within the Dayton airport facilities.
The system should have the capability to re-route bags should part of the system have a
problem such as a conveyor belt jam or screening machine breakdown. The system
should be able to re-route the bags so that the processing remains active.
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The location of the system is important in that the needs of the airport are dynamic. The
passenger flow among the airlines as well as the number of airlines will most likely
change with time. This flexibility with respect to the location of the system should allow
for these changes.
Back-up systems are important to keep the bag screening operation running even though
one or more sub-systems may fail.
The technology of the explosive detection systems, trace detection, and other screening
devices are improving over time. The system should be flexible with respect to the
ability to replace and incorporate the latest approved technology.
Shut-down procedures need to be addressed within the system. This includes procedures
to handle shut-downs caused from both a positive hit to an alarm and machine
breakdowns. This is related to the back-up systems.
The system should be upgradeable. As discussed with the inevitable changes and
improvement in technology the baggage screening system needs to allow for upgrades.
The system should be expandable. The number and sizes of the airlines could quite
possibly increase and a system that allows for expansion to accommodate this increase is
desired.
The system should be scalable to accommodate lower passenger loads and the difference
in loads between the airlines. During off-peak times, lower staff numbers should be
needed and the system should accommodate the change to the lower staff.
PASSENGER IMPACT
Clarity of use
Number of times handing the bag
Visibility of bags
Customer hassle
Queues, lines, time, overall time, least amount of changes, straight line
from point A to B
Passenger confidence
Passenger convenience
Visibility of security
Integrated with check point

The following was discussed for the first tier objective, Passenger Impact.
A simple system that is as straight forward to the passenger as possible is most desirable.
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The number of times the passenger is required to handle his/her bag should be limited as
well as the distance that the passenger must hand carry them within the airport.
The combination of the number of times the passengers have to carry their bags along
with the number of queues, and the additional distance involved in processing the
passengers roll into the hassle factor.
The visibility of the bags is important in that the passenger can observe that the security
measures are performed effectively.
The passenger should receive confidence that the system is providing them protection.
Part of this confidence is created by the visibility of the security. That can be created
through closed circuit television monitors, or presentation boards that display the routing
and screening process.
The convenience to the passenger is important and that is affected by the amount of
hassle they have to put up with.
The bag screening process should be integrated into the passenger screening checkpoint
EFFICIENCY
Bottlenecks, logistical issues, don’t forget these
Flow efficiency/congestion at the end of the system
Impact on airline staff
Number of times airline handling bags
Efficient, throughput
Automated kick off for flagged bag
Uninterrupted flow
Space utilization
Different run speeds
Reaction to first hit
Flow assurity – the bags to the right place

The following was discussed for the first tier objective Efficient
It’s important that the system doesn’t have bottlenecks that create backups, inefficient use
of the screening machines, and delay to the bag process times.
The system should have an efficient flow that avoids congestion after the bags are
screened. A build up of bags will create delays in the transfer of the bags to the planes
and impact the airlines departure times.
The impact to the airline staff should be kept to a minimum and allow for
accommodation for the various peak passenger flow times.
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Handling of the bags by the airline staff will impact the number of airline personnel
needed to handle passengers.
Utilization of the airport building space for the system is important. Building space was
limited prior to the additional screening requirements and now it’s even more important
to avoid using more space than necessary.
The throughput of the bags should be done in an efficient manner.
An automated kick off capability is important to allow for additional screening of flagged
bags while not hindering the flow of the other bags.
The uninterrupted flow capability is important.
The bags ultimately need to get to their final destinations. Part of this issue is having a
system that can maintain an accurate accountability/identification of baggage throughout
the screening process.
SECURITY
Security of equipment
Vulnerability
Visibility of equipment – mental benefit (moved to passenger confidence)
Alarm resolution
Isolation capability of a major hit/security breech

The following was discussed for the first tier objective Security
The vulnerability of the equipment is important. It’s desirable to locate the screening
system in an area with non-public access or the security identification display area
(SIDA).
It’s important that the system accommodates the various levels of alarm resolutions. (Not
sure what else we were saying here?)
The isolation capability is desired to handle major hits/threats while allowing the
remaining system and bag flow to continue.
RELIABILITY (need new name, broader, maybe suitability)
Reliability, maintainability, availability stuff, RM&A
Safety
Exposure to radiation
Comfort of screeners
Environment of screeners
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The following was discussed for the first tier objective Reliability
Reliability: It’s important that the system is able to perform without breakdowns from
machine failure or overburden by bag flow
Maintainability: The system should allow for trained personnel to perform routine work
on it to keep it running as close to its original or new operating state.
Availability: It’s important that the system be able operate when needed.
The safety to the personnel operating the screening systems is important. The system
should be designed to allow for access to the system to resolve jams, maintain and
operate equipment with the risk of injury kept to a minimum.
The environment and comfort of the screeners is important. It’s important that the
system has an environment which accommodates the shift durations of the operators.
Uncomfortable work conditions for the system operators could result in improperly
screened bags as well as slow process times.
Part of the safety issue is the protection of the screening machine operators from radiation
exposure. The system should allow for the accurate monitoring and protection of the
operators to avoid this danger.
COST (the airport is considered a money maker for the city and thus is operated in this
manner, to max profit)
Personnel
Money
Infrastructure
Cost is viewed from the standpoint that the airport is a business and it’s intended to make
a profit. The staff required to maintain, operate, and resolve problems/issues created from
the system is important. This staff includes those of the airlines, airport, and the TSA.
The personnel will have both an annual and training requirement. The training required
will be impacted by the complexity of the system for its operation and maintenance.
OPEN ITEMS:
The next meeting will begin with a review of the affinity diagram values. The bottom
tiers of the value hierarchy including measures will be developed at the next meetings.
Next week’s meeting for the Integrated Study Team was tentatively set for Wednesday
22 JAN at 1pm. A group email with next meeting’s agenda and location will be sent to
all group members no later than Monday 20 Jan.
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #3, 22 JAN 03
TIME: 1300-1700
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Airport Operations Conference Room
ATTENDEES:
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer
Mr. Ronnie Wayne, Delta Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport
Mr. Doug Warner, Dayton International Airport, Facilities
Mr. David Meek, Chief of Baggage Screeners, TSA
PURPOSE:
Continue with and finish the development of the 100% checked baggage system value
hierarchy. Begin the development of measures.
OPENING DISCUSSION:
The minutes of the previous meeting were discussed. The research timeline was
introduced with the following items.
Develop and Verify Hierarchy
Develop Measures
Weight Hierarchy
Score and Analyze Options

14 / 22 JAN 03
22 / 29 JAN 03
5 FEB 03
5 FEB 03

ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
The first tier objectives of the 100 percent checked baggage system hierarchy was
decomposed down to sub-objectives that could be measured. The development of the
hierarchy was completed during the meeting; measures were defined for the Security sub
objectives. There was not time to finish the development of measures for the other
branches.
The group reviewed the first tier of the hierarchy developed during the previous meeting.
The first tier objectives were then addressed individually along with the associated subobjectives groups introduced during the last meeting. The group decided to separate the
costs from the original hierarchy and establish a separate hierarchy for cost.
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The first tier objective Efficient was broken into three sub-objectives. They are flow,
manpower, and space. Flow is the value for a fast through put of the checked bags, free
of congestion, uninterrupted between check in and the end of the screening. This flow
also includes the need for assurance that the bags are getting to the right place.
Manpower is the value to limit the amount of personnel needed for handling and
screening. Space is the value to avoid congestion.
The first tier objective for Security was broken down into five sub objectives. They are
Equipment Vulnerability, Equipment Capability, Isolation Capability, Alarm Resolution,
and Manpower Impact. Equipment Vulnerability is the value of having a system that is
closed off from public access. Equipment Capability is the ability of a screening system
to detect explosives, the speed of processing bags and the reliability that the system will
be available. Isolation Capability is the ability of the system to separate a bag from the
flow of bags so as not to impede bag processing. Alarm Resolution is the ability of the
explosives detection equipment to assist operators in resolving alarms (alert by screening
machine that a threat has been detected.) The Manpower Impact is the value to limit the
personnel needed to maintain, operate, and resolve issues that result from the use of the
checked bag system.
The first tier objective for Ease of Operation was broken down into five sub objectives.
They are Safety, Comfort, Maintainability, Availability, and Reliability.
The first tier objective for Flexibility was broken down into three sub objectives. They
are Robustness, Expandable, and Automation.
The first tier objective for Cost was broken down into three sub objectives. They are
People, Infrastructure, and Acquisition.
The group focused on the Security tier and began to develop measures. These measures
were developed as follows:
Equipment Vulnerability: Yes/No for Public Access. If the system is located in a
Security Identification Display Area then the value is 1.0. If the public does have access
then the value is 0.
Equipment Capability: Two measures were developed, Catch Rate and False Alarm Rate.
Isolation Capability: Yes/No for Isolation Capable. If the system is capable of isolated
bags such as the latest screening machines from Invision then the value is 1.0, if the
system is not capable of isolating the bags then the value is 0.
Need to develop measures for these two sub objectives.
Alarm Resolution and Manpower Impact.
OPEN ITEMS:
The measures need to be developed for remaining lowest tier sub-objectives for the other
branches of the 100 percent checked baggage and cost hierarchies. Next week’s meeting
for the Integrated Study Team was tentatively set for Wednesday 29 JAN at 1pm.
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #4, 29 JAN 03
TIME: 1300-1600
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Airport Operations 5th Floor Conference Room
ATTENDEES:
Capt Stephen Chambal, AFIT
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer
Mr. Ronnie Wayne, Delta Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport
Mr. Bob Hall, Continental Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport
Mr. David Meek, TSA DAY
PURPOSE:
Continue with the development of the 100% checked baggage system value hierarchy.
Review those measures already proposed and develop measures for those sub-objectives
not addressed yet.
OPENING DISCUSSION:
The 100% checked baggage system value hierarchy developed from the last meeting on
22 Jan 03 was provided to begin the review. Each first tier objective of this hierarchy
was reviewed briefly along with their corresponding sub-objectives and measures. The
group then continued to develop measures.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Updates to the hierarchy are described below under their first tier objective.
SECURITY:
The security objective from the last meeting had five sub-objectives. Measures were
developed for those sub-objectives as follows:
Equipment Vulnerability:
The value for equipment vulnerability is measured by whether the system is in a public
access area of the airport or a Security Identification Display Area (SIDA). A value of 1
is given to a system that is not accessible by the public. A value of 0 is given to a system
that is accessible to the public.
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Equipment Capability:
The value for equipment capability is measured by the system’s average detection rate
and false alarm rates. The detection rate is the percentage of threats correctly identified
based on red team inspections. The detection rate measure has an x-axis that ranges from
the minimum acceptable detection rate to 100% detection. The minimum acceptable
detection rate may be as high as 90% in that case the x axis would only cover a range of
10% (Difference between 90% detection and perfect 100%). The corresponding y-axis
ranges from 0 to 1(representing the value). The minimum detection has a value of 0
while the 100% detection has a value of 1. The group decided that at 95% of the gap the
corresponding value would be 0.66. The value will increase in a positive exponential
manner as shown in the figure below.
False Alarm Rate
The false alarm rate is the number of bags that are incorrectly identified with threats
divided by the total number of bags screened. The most preferred false alarm rate is 0%
and is given a value of 1.0. The least preferred false alarm rate is 40 %. The 40% is used
as a ‘best guess’ to current minimum performance of initial alarms that are resolved and
found to be false alarms.
Isolation Capability:
The value for isolation capability is measured by whether the system is capable of
isolating bags that have shown positive. The isolation capability is desired and if the
system has this capability the value is 1.0. If it’s not isolation capable then the value is 0.
Alarm Resolution:
The value for alarm resolution is measured by the percentage of alarms that are able to be
resolved without removing the bags from the screening machines. The value for alarm
resolution increases in an exponential manner as the percentage of threats resolved
increases. A value of 0.5 is obtained for a system that resolves 30% of the alarms. A
value of 0.9 is obtained from a system that is able to resolve 90% of the alarms.
Manpower Impact: This sub-objective was removed from Security and will be
addressed within the Cost Hierarchy.
PASSENGER IMPACT:
The Passenger Impact objective is broken down into confidence and convenience.
The study group decided to define the confidence sub-objective down into communicate
security which is defined by whether the system allows the passenger to see the bag
screening and routing operation. This can be accomplished through either a closed circuit
television, windows that allow the customers to see the operation, or a display that
illustrates the route and screening measures in place at the airport.
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Visible System:
If the bag screening system has one of the three methods in place to communicate the
security then the value is 1.0. If the system is not visible and hidden from the passenger
then that is given a value of 0.
The convenience part of the passenger impact is broken down into sub-objectives for
handling bags and time.
Distance
The distance that the passenger has to move checked bag in screening process It is
preferred to have a system that will not require the passengers to move their bags at all
after checking them in at the airline ticket counter. A system that requires passengers to
move their bags 100 feet or more receives a value of 0.0. A system that does not require
passengers to move their bags after check in receives a value of 1.0.
Times Handled
The number of times the passenger has to move checked bag from one screening station
to another before screeners take custody of the bag. Having to move bags a number of
different times between security stations is considered an inconvenience as was the
distance required to move the bags. Not handling the bags at all after tagging receives a
value of 1.0. Handling them once receives a value of 0.5 and handling them more than
once receives a value of 0.0.
Time in Line
While the group felt passengers do understand and appreciate the need for security, their
patience is not unlimited. Not waiting with the bags at all is the most preferred and
receives a value of 1.0. For each minute the passenger waits the value decreases linearly
up to 15 minutes or more when the value is 0.0
EFFICIENT:
The group divided the first tier objective Efficient into three sub-objectives. These are
Flow, Manpower, and Space. Flow is measured by both time it takes on average for the
bags to complete its movement through the system as well as how the bags are delivered
to the Airlines baggage handlers.
Flow
The flow is further defined by the time the bags take to be processed from the point of
being tagged by the airline ticket personnel and reaching the make up room. The bag
delivery method is also used to define flow.
Time
Throughput of the baggage with emphasis to avoid congestion, bottlenecks, and
interruption.
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Bag Delivery Method
The greatest value for the baggage delivery method is from a system that sends screened
bags to separate baggage handling areas for each airline. This method receives a value of
1.0. The second most preferential delivery setting is for a common make-up room for all
airlines but with sorted areas for each airline’s bags. This method receives a value of 0.8.
The least preferred delivery method is for all bags to be delivered to a common make up
room and not sorted by airline. This method receives a value of 0.0.
Manpower
Personnel fluctuations necessary to accommodate the varying passenger load. The
manpower sub-objective value is measured by the fluctuation in number of operators
necessary to support the system. No fluctuation is most preferred and receives a value of
1.0. A system that requires minor fluctuations in personnel levels is the second most
preferred, receiving a value of 0.8. Minor fluctuations are variations of ten percent or
less. A system that requires major fluctuation in personnel is the least preferred and
receives a value of 0.0. Major fluctuations are personnel variations of more than 10
percent.
Space
The value for the space sub-objective is measured by whether additional floor space will
be needed to be constructed to support the operation. It is most preferred to have a
system that requires no terminal floor space; such a system would receive a value of 1.0.
The second most preferred system would take up no more floor space than currently
available to conduct baggage screening in the lobby area without changing the existing
floor layout. That system would receive a value of 0.5. The least preferred system would
require more floor space than is currently used and that system would receive a value of
0.0
At this point the group ended the meeting
OPEN ITEMS:
In an effort to make an efficient use of the next meeting it was suggested to send out a
request for input on the remaining measures. The Ease of Operation and Flexibility
branches haven’t had measures developed for their lowest tier sub-objective.
All members of the study group have been asked to forward any recommendations on the
remaining objectives that need to have measures developed to Capt Meade. In addition,
any questions on the objectives and measures already developed should also be sent.
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #5, 05 FEB 03
TIME: 1300-1600
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Airport Operations 5th Floor Conference Room
ATTENDEES:
Capt Stephen Chambal, AFIT
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer
Mr. Ronnie Wayne, Delta Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport
Mr. Jon Vrabel, Dayton International Airport, Operations
PURPOSE:
The development of the 100 percent checked baggage system value hierarchy has been
completed. Measures were also developed for several of the lowest tier sub-objectives.
Measures will be developed during this meeting for the Ease of Operation and Flexibility
branches of the 100 percent checked baggage system value hierarchy and the cost
hierarchy.
OPENING DISCUSSION:
The cost objectives were removed from the 100 percent checked baggage system
hierarchy. These cost objectives will be used for a separate cost hierarchy. The group
started with the 100 percent checked baggage system hierarchy and finished development
of the measures. The group then moved to the Cost hierarchy and finished development
of all measures.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Updates to the hierarchy are described below under their first tier objective.
EASE OF OPERATION:
The safety and comfort for the operators of the baggage screening system along with the
maintainability, availability, and reliability
Safety
Number of features above Minimum Required, Safety. Example of feature includes a
conveyor shut down switches that isolates portion of the baggage systems while allowing
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other parts of the conveyor to continue operating. Each feature above zero receives a
value increment of 0.2. Five or more features receives a value of 1.0
Comfort
Number of Features above Minimum Required, Comfort. Example includes item such as
screening system monitors with reduced glare to reduce eye strain and will lead to more
attentive operators. Each feature above zero receives a value increment of 0.2. Five or
more features receives a value of 1.0
Maintainability / Availability
The average time for repairs to the system. A repair that takes more than 24 hours is
considered unacceptable and would receive a value of 0.0. The most preferred repair
time of 1 hour or less receives a value of 1.0. A repair time of 1 to 8 hours receives a
value of 0.5. A system that has average repairs of 8 to 24 hours receives a value of 0.2.
Reliability
The number of breakdowns between normally scheduled maintenance downtime is the
measure for reliability. A system that averages no breakdowns within the maintenance
cycle receives a value of 1.0. A system with 3 or more breakdowns on average per
month is considered unacceptable and receives a value of 0.0. A system that has an
average of one breakdown receives a value of 0.5. A system that has an average of two
breakdowns receives a value of 0.2.
FLEXIBILITY
The capability of adapting to new, different, or changing requirements
Conveyor Redundancy
Measure is how many back up measures are available on the conveyor system in case of a
conveyor breakdown. The most preferred realistic number of redundant conveyor system
is 3 or more for the Dayton International Airport. This system receives a value of 1.0.
The least preferred option is for the checked baggage system to have no redundant
conveyor systems. This system receives a value of 0.0.
Detection Redundancy
Measure is how many back up detection systems are available to screen bags identified as
threats. A system that has 3 or more redundant detection features is most preferred and
receives a value of 1.0. The least preferred option is for the checked baggage system to
have no redundant detection systems. This system receives a value of 0.0.
Expandable
It is most preferred to have a checked baggage system that can be expanded to take on a
larger passenger load accommodating any expansion in passenger loads and air carriers.
This is a yes/no measure. If the system can be expanded it receives a value of 1.0. If it
can not be expanded, it receives a value of 0.0.

100

Automation
Tracking
It is preferred to have a checked baggage system that is capable of tracking bags in the
screening process and can tell where a checked bag is located. This like the expandable
measure, is a yes no measure. A system that automatically tracks checked bags gets a
value of 1.0 and a system that is not capable of tracking automatically gets a 0.0
.
Routing Divert
The study group prefers a checked baggage system is capable of automatically routing
and diverting bags. Such automated handling reduces personnel needs and, when
properly implemented, provides better service than manual handling. If the system can
automatically route and divert is gets a value of 1.0 and if it can not it gets a value of 0.0
Sort to Airline Make-up room
If the system is capable of automatically sorting bags to airline make up rooms it gets a
value of 1.0 if not it gets a value of 0.0.
COST
People
The personnel necessary to operate the system. The most preferred number of operators
is 3 which receive a value of 1.0. The least preferred is 10 or more operators which
receives a value of 0. The value decreases linearly as the number of operators increases
from 3 to 10.
Infrastructure
The level of construction necessary to install the system. A system that can be installed
without construction to the facility is most preferred and receives a value of 1.0. A
system that requires minor work receives a value of 0.5 and major work gets a value of
0.0.
Acquisition
The purchases made for a system which includes conveyor systems, display monitors.
. A system that will not incur any cost to the Airport for these items is the most preferred
and receives a value of 1.0. A system that requires 1.5 Million dollars (NPV) or more is
the least preferred and receives a value of 0.0. As the cost for these items moves from
zero dollars to 1.5 Million dollars (NPV) the value decreases linearly
OPEN ITEMS:
Both hierarchies need to be given weights by the decision maker. The next meeting will
include Jon Vrabel and Youseff Elzein, who will weigh the hierarchies on behalf of Mr.
Eugene Conrad.
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #6, 14 FEB 03
TIME: 1000-1200
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Airport Operations 5th Floor Conference Room
ATTENDEES:
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer
Mr. Jon Vrabel, Dayton International Airport, Operations
PURPOSE:
Weight both the 100% checked baggage system value hierarchy and cost hierarchy.
OPENING DISCUSSION:
The hierarchy objectives were reviewed. This was brief, as both Jon and Youseff took
part in each phase of the value model development and were already familiar with the
model. The 100 marble method was then used to provide direct weighting to each
objective and measure of the hierarchy.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
Capt Meade recorded the local weights as provided by Jon Vrabel and Youseff Elzein.
These weights would be converted to global weights and input into the Logical Decisions
for Windows software to analyze two notional alternatives.
The Passenger Impact and Flexibility tier objectives received 0.25 of the weight each.
They were deemed the most important to the Director of Aviation. The Ease of
Operation objective was given a weight of 0.20. The Efficient objective was given a
weight of 0.17. The Security objective was given a weight of 0.13. Security was given
the least weight but this is not because security is not important. The security objectives
provide value to capabilities above and beyond the minimum accepted criteria of the
FAA and TSA. These minimum accepted standards are considered stringent. Therefore
the other objectives were given more weight. The Passenger Impact and Flexibility
objectives were given the most weight because they were seen as the most important to
the passengers and the ability to accommodate various passenger loads. The Ease of
Operation objective was given more weight than the Efficient objective because the
standards for the workers were deemed as more important than the Efficient objectives.

102

Potential 100 percent checked baggage system alternatives were discussed. It was
decided to use the current Terminal Floor system as well as a notional Inline system. The
inline system would be integrated into a checked baggage system. Capt Meade would
use the preferences identified by the study group for the notional inline baggage
screening system.

103

Bibliography
United States Congress. Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, Public Law 106-528,
106th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington GPO 2000.
National Material Advisory Board. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve
Aviation Security: 1st Report. Publication NMAB 482-5. National Academies
Press , 1999.
National Material Advisory Board. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve
Aviation Security: Second Report: Progress Toward Objectives. Publication
NMAB 503. National Academies Press , 2002.
National Material Advisory Board. Configuration Management and Performance
Verification of Explosive Detection Systems. Publication NMAB 482-3. National
Academies Press, 1998.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing
the Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security. GAO/T-RCED-97-90. Washington: GPO, 1997.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced
Explosives Detection Devices. GAO/RCED-97-119R. Washington: GPO, 1997.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: FAA’s Actions to Study Responsibilities
for Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies. GAO/RCED-99-53.
Washington: GPO, 1999.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives
Detection Devices. GAO/RCED-97-111R. Washington: GPO, 1997.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve
Security. GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237. Washington: GPO, 1996.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is
Under Way, but Completion Will Take Several Years. GAO/RCED-98-102.
Washington: GPO, 1988.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term
Attention Is Needed. GAO/T-RCED 98-190. Washington: GPO, 1988.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing LongStanding Screener Performance Problems. GAO/T-RCED-00-125. Washington:
GPO, 2000.

104

General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Technology’s Role in Addressing
Vulnerabilities. GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262. Washington: GPO, 1996.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Faces Immediate and Long Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington:
GPO, 1997.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed.
GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251. Washington: GPO, 1996.
General Accounting Office. Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement
Limit FAA in Identifying and Responding to Risks. GAP/RCED-98-6.
Washington: GPO, 1998.
Butler, Viggo and Poole W. Robert. Rethinking Checked-Baggage Screening, Policy
Study 297. July 2002. Los Angeles CA.
Clemen, Robert T, and Reilly, Terrence Making Hard Decisions with Decision Tools 2nd
Edition. Belmont CA: Duxbury Press, 1996.
Transportation Research Board. Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation: The New
Transportation Security Imperative. Special Report 270. National Academies
Press, 2002.
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final Report,
February 12, 1997.
Hamill, Jonathan T., Modeling Information Assurance: A Value Focused Thinking
Approach, School of Systems and Engineering Management, Air Force Institute
of Technology (AU), Wright Patterson AFB OH, Mar 2002.
Jackson, Jack A., Jones, Brian L., Lehmkuhl, Lee J.2025 Operational Analysis 1996.
Jurk, David M. Decision Analysis with Value-Focused Thinking as a Methodology to
Select Force Protection Initiatives for Evaluation, School of Systems and
Engineering Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright
Patterson AFB OH, Mar 2002.
Kauvar, Gary, Rostker, Bernard, Shaver, Russell Safer Skies Baggage Screening and
Beyond with Supporting Analysis, RAND 2002.
Keeney, Ralph L. “Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking.”
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

105

Kirkwood, Craig W. Strategic Decision Making: Multicriteria Decision Analysis with
Spreadsheets. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997.
Kloeber, Jack M. Class Lecture, OPER 745, Multiple Objective Decision Analysis.
Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright Patterson AFB OH, Summer 2000.
Lazarick, Richard and Cammaroto, Robert Recommended Security Guidelines for
Airport Planning, Design and Construction DOT/FAA/AR-00/52 2001.
National Research Council. Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism. Washington: National Academies Press,
2002.
Parnell, G., Conley, H., Jackson, J., Lehmkuhl, L, and Andrew, J.,”Foundations 2025: A
Framework for Evaluating Future Air and Space Forces,” Management Science,
1998, Vol 44, No 10, 1998,pp 1336-1350.
Public Law 107-71 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 19 November 2001.
Shoviak, Mark J., Decision Analysis Methodology to Evaluate Integrated Solid Waste
Management Alternatives For a Remote Alaskan Air Station.. School of Systems
and Engineering Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright
Patterson AFB OH, Mar 2001.
Sweet, Kathleen M. Terrorism and Airport Security, Symposium Series Vol 68, The
Edwin Mellin Press, 2002.

106

Vita
Captain Quincy Meade graduated from Parry McCluer High School in Buena
Vista, Virginia. He attended Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia where he
graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering in 1995. He was
commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps in May of 1995.
His first assignment was to the 78 Civil Engineering Group at Robins AFB, GA.
While at Robins AFB, he served as a civil design engineer, maintenance engineer, and as
the Chief of the Simplified Acquisition of Base Engineering Requirements (SABER)
flight.
In August of 1998, he was assigned to the 45th Civil Engineer Squadron, Patrick
AFB, FL where he served as an the Chief of the Delta Program within the Engineering
flight at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. While stationed at Patrick AFB he deployed
in August of 1999 for three months to Ali Al Salem Air Base Kuwait and served as the
Base Civil Engineer. In September of 2000 he deployed to Micronesia for eight months
leading a 13 person Civic Action Team performing humanitarian construction projects
and providing a medical and vocational apprentice training program on the remote island
of Pohnpei.
In August of 2001 he entered the Graduate School of Engineering and
Management, Air Force Institute of Technology. Upon graduation, Captain Meade will
join the Headquarters Air Education and Training Command Civil Engineer’s Staff at
Randolph, AFB, TX.

107

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway,
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

2. REPORT TYPE

03-25-2003
4.

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)

Nov 2002 – Mar 2003

Master’s Thesis

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

LONG TERM IMPLEMENTATION OF A 100 PERCENT
CHECKED BAGGAGE SCREENING SYSTEM: A VALUE
FOCUSED THINKING APPROACH

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

AUTHOR(S)

Meade, Quincy, Captain, USAF

5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Street, Building 642, WPAFB OH 45433-7765

AFIT/GEE/ENS/03-02

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Dayton International Airport
Attn: Mr. Eugene B. Conrad
3600 Terminal Drive, Suite 300
Vandalia, OH45377

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

COMM: 937-454-8212
e-mail: econrad@flydayton.com

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, carried out via aircraft hijackings, clearly demonstrated the massive destruction potential when
vulnerabilities in the aviation system are exploited. Airport security measures have since been strengthened and new measures have been set in
place. With the passage of the Aviation Security and Transportation Act of 2001 the checked baggage systems at U.S. Airports are now required to
screen all checked bags with explosive detection devices. This is a significant increase from the small percentage of bags that were previously
screened. Rather than allowing for the long term, phased planning that the original 2009 date would have provided, the requirement to screen all
checked bags by 31 December 2002 forced airports to implement interim screening systems which can impact the efficient processing of passengers
and baggage. A long term solution is needed for a 100 percent checked baggage system that provides the required security while minimizing
negative impacts to aviation stakeholders including the airport operators, airlines, passengers, and the Transportation Security Administration. This
thesis, focusing on Dayton International Airport, uses a Value Focused Thinking methodology to build a value model for evaluating potential long
term solutions for 100 percent checked baggage system alternatives.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

Aviation Security, Baggage Screening, Security, Value Focused Thinking, Decision Analysis
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT

U

b.

ABSTRACT

U

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

c. THIS PAGE

U

UU

18. NUMBER
OF
PAGES
121

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
Stephen P. Chambal, Capt, USAF (ENS)
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(937) 255-6565, ext 4314; e-mail: Stephen.Chambal@afit.edu
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

